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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study optimal trade policy in the canonical two-sector Krugman
(1980) model, where one sector is characterized by monopolistic competition, increasing returns
and iceberg trade costs, while the other features perfect competition and constant returns.
Within this framework we study cooperative, unilateral and strategic (Nash) production, import
and export subsidies/taxes.
The common wisdom of the literature1 (Venables (1987), Helpman and Krugman (1989),
Ossa (2011)) is that in this model unilateral trade policy is set so as to agglomerate firms
in the domestic economy in order to reduce the domestic price index, thereby increasing do-
mestic welfare. An import tariff makes foreign differentiated goods more expensive relative to
domestic ones so that domestic consumers shift expenditure towards domestic differentiated
goods. As a consequence, domestic firms sell more thus making profits and foreign firms sell
less thus making losses. This triggers entry into the domestic differentiated sector and exit
out of the foreign differentiated sector, thereby reducing the domestic price index – since now
less of the domestically consumed goods are subject to transport costs – and increasing the
foreign one. Similarly, a production or an export subsidy also renders the domestic market a
more attractive location and reduces the domestic price index at the expense of increasing the
foreign one. According to the literature, this home market externality (also called production
relocation externality) provides a reason for protectionist and ultimately welfare detrimental
unilateral trade policy in the Krugman (1980) model and, as argued by Ossa (2011), gives an
alternative theoretical justification to the neoclassical terms-of-trade externality explanation
(Johnson (1953-1954), Grossman and Helpman (1985) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999)) as to
why countries need to sign trade agreements. Similarly, the same mechanism also provides a
theoretical justification for the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s limitation of production
and export subsidies,2 which cannot be explained within the neoclassical framework.3
Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that, in contrast to the previous literature, the
1A detailed review of the literature is provided in the next section.
2See, e.g., WTO (2006). GATT Article XVI and the Uruguay Round Subsidies Code prohibit the use of
export subsidies, while the second also establishes that countervailing duties can be imposed on countries using
production subsidies subject to an injury test.
3Production and export subsidies are puzzling within the neoclassical framework because they increase foreign
welfare at the expense of domestic welfare.
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home market externality – defined as the incentive to reduce the domestic price index via a
relocation of firms to the domestic economy – is generally not a motive for unilateral or strategic
trade policy in the Krugman (1980) model. Instead, non-cooperative trade policies are driven
by two incentives: on the one hand, domestic policy makers try to increase production efficiency
and, on the other hand, they want to improve domestic terms of trade. Second, we find that
once countries are allowed to simultaneously choose all three instruments, they set production
subsidies to eliminate the production inefficiency and they use trade instruments to improve
their terms of trade. This implies that the only remaining international externality – and thus
the only reason why countries should sign a trade agreement – is due to countries’ attempt to
manipulate their terms of trade.
Observe that the production inefficiency arises because there are two sectors in the model,
so that monopolistic markups lead to a too low provision of variety in the monopolistically
competitive sector.4 Thus, policy makers try to improve the use of domestic resources by
increasing entry into the differentiated sector. Depending on the set of policy instruments
available, this attempt to increase production efficiency may impose a relocation externality
on the other country. However, such relocation externality disappears once policy makers can
completely eliminate the production inefficiency. Indeed, non-cooperative policy makers do not
have an incentive to exploit the home market externality: They recognize that a reduction
in the aggregate price index due to firm relocation cannot be welfare improving, since it is
exactly offset by a fall in household’s income. Finally, the use of policy instruments required
to achieve greater production efficiency has negative terms-of-trade effects and non-cooperative
trade policy is determined by the trade off between these two motives.
To clarify the interplay between these incentives, we start by considering production subsi-
dies/taxes as the only available policy instrument. A production subsidy increases profits of
firms in the domestic differentiated sector and triggers a relocation of firms from the foreign to
the domestic economy, thereby increasing domestic production efficiency. However, this comes
at the cost of a negative terms-of-trade effect because the production subsidy reduces the in-
ternational price of domestically produced varieties. We show that the balance always tips in
favor of the terms-of-trade effect before production efficiency is achieved: the non-cooperative
4In their seminal paper, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) show that the market solution is not first-best Pareto
optimal in such a model, and that subsidies on fixed costs and on marginal costs are required to implement it.
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outcome is a production subsidy that is always lower than the cooperatively set one. Thus, the
relocation externality – which is a consequence of policy makers’ attempt to increase production
efficiency – does not induce inefficiently high production subsidies. Instead, the terms-of-trade
externality leads to an inefficiently low subsidy level.
The result on production subsidies makes it clear that the desire to achieve production ef-
ficiency is an important motive for non-cooperative policy choice. Keeping this in mind, we
next study import subsidies/tariffs. First, we consider a situation where monopolistic distor-
tions have been eliminated by appropriate production subsidies, so that the market allocation
is first-best efficient. In this case the only remaining motive for import policy is the terms-of-
trade externality. As a consequence, the optimal non-cooperative import policy entails import
subsidies, which aim at relocating firms to the Foreign economy and thereby indirectly im-
proving domestic terms of trade: by reducing the number of domestically produced varieties
and increasing the foreign one, an import subsidy increases the welfare-relevant price index of
exports relative to the one of imports. In contrast, when starting from the (inefficient) free
trade allocation production efficiency calls for a tariff, which shifts domestic demand towards
domestically produced varieties, causes entry into the differentiated sector at home, and real-
locates labor to this sector. This imposes a relocation externality on the other country, where
firms exit. However, such a policy comes at the cost of worsened terms of trade due to a fall
in the relative price index of exportables. Overall, production efficiency effects dominate the
indirect terms-of-trade motive and the Nash equilibrium outcome is tariffs.
A similar result holds for non-cooperative export policy. When monopolistic distortions have
been eliminated by appropriate production subsidies, terms-of-trade effects are the only motive
for non-cooperative policy makers. In this case the optimal non-cooperative export policy is
an export tax, which aims at improving domestic terms of trade both directly, by increasing
the international price of exported varieties, and indirectly by triggering exit of firms from the
domestic economy and entry in the foreign one. Differently, when starting from the (inefficient)
free trade allocation non-cooperative policy makers set export subsidies, which intend to induce
entry into the domestic differentiated sector by relocating firms from the foreign economy and
thus improve production efficiency. This motive dominates the negative terms-of-trade effect
of export subsidies.
Finally, we analyze a situation where countries can set production, import and export policy
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instruments simultaneously. This is the relevant situation if one wants to address the question
why countries need to sign trade agreements, given that in the absence of such agreements the
set of tax instruments that can be used strategically is not limited to a single production or
trade tax. In line with our above results for single instruments, we find that non-cooperative
policy makers choose the level of production subsidies that exactly offsets the monopolistic
distortions, and that they set import subsidies and export taxes, both of which aim at improving
domestic terms of trade (directly or indirectly). This result is important for various reasons:
first, it corroborates our previous claim that relocation externalities are only a consequence of
production inefficiency. If policy makers dispose of sufficiently many instruments to address
both incentives – namely production efficiency and terms of trade – separately, only the latter
imposes an international externality; second, it clarifies that in the Krugman (1980) model the
only role of international trade agreements is to solve international externalities due to terms-
of-trade effects. Relocation effects only become a relevant motive for trade policy, once the set
of policy instruments is restricted, so that production efficiency cannot be improved without
causing other distortions.
1.1 Related Literature
Our results differ markedly from those of the previous literature on trade policy in the two-
sector Krugman (1980) model (Venables (1987), Helpman and Krugman (1989) chapter 7 and
Ossa (2011)). All these contributions find that in this model non-cooperative trade policy is
driven by home market effects, leading to inefficiencies compared to free trade. In particular,
Venables (1987) studies unilateral incentives to set, alternatively, tariffs, production or export
subsidies and shows that any of those can improve domestic welfare compared to free trade
due to the home market effect. However, he does not study the welfare consequences of a
strategic game. Helpman and Krugman (1989) limit their discussion to unilaterally set tariffs,
while Ossa (2011) considers a tariff game, where positive tariffs are set in equilibrium due to
the home market effect. While we also find that non-cooperative import policy leads to tariffs,
these are set to improve production efficiency and not to reduce the domestic price level.
A key difference between those contributions and our paper is the treatment of income effects
generated by the policy intervention. To avoid the complications arising from the revenue
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consequences of tax policies, all previous contributions have assumed that tariff income is a
pure waste5 and that there are no other taxes, so that income is fixed. However, it is only in
this special case, that the incentive to reduce the domestic price level via a relocation of firms is
present. In the more general case, the relocation incentive is just a consequence of production
inefficiency. Observe that this difference matters: once production subsidies can be set so as
to achieve production efficiency, the relocation externality disappears and import subsidies are
set, which aim at improving terms of trade.
Also closely related to our paper is Bagwell and Staiger (2009), who consider a two-sector
Krugman (1980) model, allowing policy makers to simultaneously choose import and export
taxes. They show that in this case Nash-equilibrium policy choices are explained exclusively by
the terms-of-trade effects and not by the relocation externality, because import-tariff-induced
relocation effects are counterbalanced by export-subsidy-induced relocation effects. While al-
lowing for revenue effects of trade taxes, for analytical tractability they assume quasi-linear
utility. This ensures that tax policies do not generate income effects on the demand for dif-
ferentiated products. Compared to their work our contributions are the following ones: we
provide analytical solutions for the general specification where tax revenues generate income
effects on the demand of differentiated goods; we allow for production taxes in addition to
import and export taxes. The advantage of this more general approach is that it underlines the
crucial role played by production inefficiency and points out the absence of the home market
externality. Finally, in line with Bagwell and Staiger (2009)’s result, we show that when all
three policy instruments can be set strategically, the only remaining international externality
is the terms-of-trade effect.
Other related work is Gros (1987), who studies an import tariff game in the one-sector variant
of the Krugman (1980) model. In that version of the model relocation effects are absent and
the free trade allocation is Pareto-optimal. He finds that in the Nash equilibrium policy makers
set import tariffs which aim at increasing domestic wages due to terms-of-trade effects.
Finally, Flam and Helpman (1987) and Helpman and Krugman (1989), chapter 7 discuss a
production efficiency effect of trade policy, which is very similar to the production efficiency
effect as defined in the present paper. Since with imperfect competition prices are set above
5Ossa (2011) provides a numerical solution for the case when tariff revenues are redistributed. However, he
does non allow for other tax instruments and does not consider the role played by the production inefficiency.
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marginal costs, domestic consumption of each variety is too low. Thus, an import tariff (or a
production or export subsidy), which shifts demand towards domestic varieties, can improve
efficiency. However, their effect refers to changes in average cost induced by changes in firm size
and not to changes in the number of domestic firms. Since firm size provided by the market
is optimal in the Krugman (1980) model, there is no room for a production efficiency effect in
their sense.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we set up the model. In section 3 we
compare the market allocation with the planner solution and discuss cooperative and non-
cooperative policy makers’ problems and incentives. Sections 4, 5 and 6 are dedicated to the
study of individual policy instruments: production taxes/subsidies, import tariffs/subsidies and
export taxes/subsidies. Section 7 considers simultaneous choice of all policy instruments and
the last section presents our conclusions.
2 The Model
The setup is exactly as in Venables (1987) and Ossa (2011). The only difference is that we allow
for transfers. The world economy consists of two countries: Home (H) and Foreign (F). Each
country produces a homogeneous good and a continuum of differentiated goods. All goods are
tradable but only the differentiated goods are subject to transport costs. The differentiated
goods sector is characterized by monopolistic competition, while there is perfect competition in
the homogeneous good sector. Both countries are identical in terms of preferences, production
technology, market structure and size. All variables are indexed such that the first sub-index
refers to the location of consumption and the second subindex to the location of production.
Finally, varieties in the differentiated sector are indexed with i, while countries are indexed
with j.
2.1 Households
Households’ utility function in the Home country is given by:
U(CH , ZH) ≡ CαHZ1−αH , (1)
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where CH aggregates over the varieties of differentiated goods, ZH represents consumption of the
homogeneous good and α is the expenditure share of the differentiated bundle in the aggregate
consumption basket. While the homogeneous good is identical across countries, each country
produces a different subset of differentiated goods. In particular, NH varieties are produced in
the Home country while NF are produced by Foreign. The differentiated varieties produced in
the two countries are aggregated with a CES function:6
CH =
[
C
ε−1
ε
HH + C
ε−1
ε
HF
] ε
ε−1
(2)
CHH =
[∫ NH
0
cHH(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
CHF =
[∫ NF
0
cHF (i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
(3)
Here, CHH is the domestic consumption bundle of varieties produced at Home, CHF is the do-
mestic consumption bundle of Foreign produced varieties, cHH(i) denotes domestic consumption
of a domestically produced variety, cHF (i) is domestic consumption of a Foreign produced va-
riety and ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and Foreign bundles and
between different varieties. Analogous definitions hold for Foreign consumption bundles.
Given the Dixit-Stiglitz structure of preferences, the households’ maximization problem can
be solved in three stages. At the first two stages, households choose how much to consume of
each Home and Foreign variety and how to allocate consumption between the domestic and the
Foreign bundle. The optimality conditions imply the following domestic demand functions and
domestic price indices:
cHH(i) =
[
pHH(i)
PHH
]−ε
CHH CHH =
[
PHH
PH
]−ε
CH (4)
cHF (i) =
[
pHF (i)
PHF
]−ε
CHF CHF =
[
PHF
PH
]−ε
CH , (5)
6Note that our definitions for CHH and CHF imply CH =
[∫ NH
0
cHH(i)
ε−1
ε di+
∫ NF
0
cHF (i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
i.e., the
model is the standard one considered in this literature. However, it is convenient to define optimal consumption
indices.
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PH =
[
P 1−εHH + P
1−ε
HF
] 1
1−ε (6)
PHH =
[∫ NH
0
pHH(i)
1−εdi
] 1
1−ε
PHF =
[∫ NF
0
pHF (i)
1−εdi
] 1
1−ε
, (7)
where PH is the domestic price index of the differentiated bundle, PHH and PHF are domestic
price indices of Home and Foreign produced bundles of differentiated goods respectively and
pHH(i) (pHF (i)) is the domestic price of variety i produced by Home (Foreign).
In the last stage, households choose how to allocate income between the homogeneous good and
the differentiated bundle. Thus, they maximize (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
PHCH + pZHZH = IH , (8)
where IH = WHL+TH , L is the total labor available in each country, WH is the domestic wage
rate, pZH is the domestic price of the homogeneous good, and TH is a lump sum transfer which
depends on the tax scheme adopted by the domestic government. The solution to the domestic
consumer problem implies that the marginal rate of substitution between the homogeneous
good and the differentiated bundle equals their relative price:
α
1− α
ZH
CH
=
PH
pZH
(9)
Foreign households solve a symmetric problem.
2.2 Firms
Firms in the differentiated sector operate under monopolistic competition. They pay a fixed
cost in terms of labor, f , and then produce with linear technology:
yH(i) = LCH(i)− f, (10)
where LCH(i) is the amount of labor allocated to the production of variety i in the differentiated
sector. Goods sold in the Foreign market are subject to an iceberg transport cost τ > 1. The
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government of each country j ∈ {H,F} disposes of three fiscal instruments. A production
tax/subsidy (τCj) on firms’ fixed and marginal costs,
7 a tariff/subsidy on imports (τIj) and
a tax/subsidy on exports (τXj). Note that τmj indicates a gross tax for m ∈ {C, I,X} i.e.,
τmj < 1 indicates a subsidy and τmj > 1 indicates a tax. In what follows, we will use the
word tax whenever we refer to a policy instrument without specifying whether τmj is smaller or
larger than one. We assume that taxes are paid directly by the firms. Given the constant price
elasticity of demand, optimal prices charged by Home firms in the domestic market (pHH(i))
are a fixed markup over their perceived marginal cost (τCHWH), and optimal prices paid by
Foreign consumers for Home produced varieties (pFH(i)) equal domestic prices augmented by
transport costs and trade taxes:8
pHH(i) = τCH
ε
ε− 1WH pFH(i) = τIF τXHτpHH(i) (11)
Foreign firms adopt symmetric optimal pricing rules:
pFF (i) = τCF
ε
ε− 1WF pHF (i) = τIHτXF τpFF (i) (12)
The homogenous good is produced in both countries j with identical production technology:
QZj = LZj, (13)
where LZj is the amount of labor allocated to producing the homogeneous good. Since the
good is sold in a perfectly competitive market without trade costs, price equals marginal cost
and is the same in both countries. We assume that the homogeneous good is produced in both
countries in equilibrium. Given the production technology, this implies factor price equalization:
pZH = pZF = WH = WF (14)
7Production taxes are levied on both fixed and marginal costs. This assumption is necessary to keep firm
size unaffected by production taxes, which turns out to be optimal, as we will show in section 3.1.
8Following the previous literature (Venables (1987), Ossa (2011)), we assume that tariffs and export taxes
are charged ad valorem on the factory gate price augmented by transport costs. This implies that transport
services are taxed.
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For convenience, we normalize pZH = 1.
Using the optimal pricing rules just derived, it is possible to rewrite the domestic price index
of the differentiated bundle as:
PH =
[
NH
(
ε
ε− 1τCH
)1−ε
+NF
(
ε
ε− 1τCF τIHτXF τ
)1−ε] 11−ε
(15)
Note that trade policy can reduce the price index through three different channels. First,
because of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, increasing the total number of varieties reduces the price
level. This is the so called love for variety effect. Second, by increasing NH at the expense of
NF , the policy maker lowers the price level since Home households can now consume a larger
fraction of goods for which they do not pay transport costs. This is the so called home market
externality. Finally, trade policy can reduce the price level through the direct effect of subsidies
on the prices of individual varieties.
2.3 Government
All government revenues are redistributed to consumers through a lump sum transfer Tj. The
government is assumed to run a balanced budget. Hence, the domestic government’s budget
constraint is given by:
(τIH − 1)τXF τPFFCHF + (τXH − 1)τPHHCFH + (τCH − 1)
∫ NH
0
WH(yH(i) + f)di = TH (16)
Government income consists of import tax revenues charged on imports of differentiated goods
gross of transport costs and Foreign export taxes (thus, tariffs are charged on CIF values
of Foreign exports); export tax revenues charged on exports gross of transport costs; and
production tax revenues from taxes on marginal and fixed costs. The foreign government has
a symmetric budget constraint.
2.4 Market Clearing Conditions
The market clearing condition for a differentiated variety produced at Home is given by:
11
yH(i) = cHH(i) + τcFH(i) (17)
A similar condition holds for Foreign varieties. Free entry in the differentiated sector implies
that monopolistic producers make zero profit in equilibrium9 and that production of each dif-
ferentiated variety is fixed: yH(i) ≡ y = (ε− 1)f .10 Moreover, given that firms share the same
production technology, the equilibrium is symmetric: all firms in the differentiated sector of
a given country charge the same price and produce the same quantity. Hence, in equilibrium
pHH(i)
PHH
= N
1
ε−1
H and PHF = τIHτXF τPFF . Using these price relations, the demand functions (4)
and (5) and the fact that the production of each variety is equal to (ε − 1)f , we can rewrite
the market clearing condition of domestically produced differentiated varieties (17) as:
(ε− 1)f = N
ε
1−ε
H P
−ε
HH
[
P εHCH + τ
1−ε(τIF τXH)−εP εFCF
]
(18)
Using the demand functions, the market clearing condition for the homogeneous good – QZH +
QZF = ZH + ZF – can be written as:
QZH +QZF =
(1− α)
α
[PHCH + PFCF ] (19)
Equilibrium in the labor market implies that L = LCH +LZH with LCH = NHLCH(i). Making
use of (10) and (13), labor market clearing can be written as:
QZH = L−NHεf (20)
Finally, we assume that there is no trade in financial assets, so trade is balanced. The balanced
trade condition is given by:11
(QZH − ZH) + ττXHPHHCFH = ττXFPFFCHF (21)
The left hand side of (21) is the sum of the net export value of the homogeneous goods and
9ΠH(i) = cHH(i) [pHH(i)− τCH ] + cFH(i) [τpHH(i)− ττCH ]− fτCH = 0.
10Note that production taxes on fixed costs are necessary for this result, as can be easily verified from the
free entry condition.
11Import taxes are collected directly by the governments at the border so they do not enter into this condition.
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the value of exports of differentiated varieties (at CIF inclusive international prices), while the
right hand side is the value of imports of differentiated varieties (at CIF inclusive international
prices).
As standard in the trade literature (see e.g., Helpman and Krugman (1989)), we define
the direct terms-of-trade effect as a change of the international price of exports (τXHpHH =
τXHτCH
ε
ε−1) relative to the one of imports (τXFpFF = τXF τCF
ε
ε−1) of individual varieties. This
implies that only production and export taxes have direct terms-of-trade effects. In particular,
a domestic production or export tax increases the international price of exports one to one and
improves domestic terms of trade, while a foreign export tax or production tax increases the
international price of imports and worsens domestic individual terms of trade. As will become
clear in section 3.3, where we discuss policy makers’ incentives, it is useful to define also the
consumption-based terms-of-trade effect as a change in the international prices of the aggregate
exported bundle (τXHPHH = N
−1
ε−1
H τXHτCH
ε
ε−1) relative to the one of the aggregate imported
bundle (τXFPFF = N
−1
ε−1
F τXF τCF
ε
ε−1).
12 The main difference between the two definitions is that
trade policy can influence the consumption-based terms of trade both directly, through its effect
on the international prices of individual varieties, and also indirectly, through its effect on the
number of varieties produced in the two countries. In particular, Home’s consumption-based
terms of trade improve whenever the number of Home varieties decreases or when the number
of Foreign varieties increases. The intuition for this alternative definition becomes clear from
the trade balance condition (21): an increase in the number of Foreign varieties implies that do-
mestic consumers obtain a larger amount of the Foreign consumption bundle – which includes
more varieties and therefore is more valuable for consumers – for each unit of the domestic
consumption bundle. Note that, according to this alternative definition, import taxes do have
indirect terms-of-trade effects through their impact on the number of varieties produced in each
country. When studying trade policy, we will always clearly differentiate between direct and
indirect terms-of-trade effects.
12Defining terms-of-trade effects as changes of the relative international prices of aggregate export and import
bundles follows the convention of the international macroeconomics literature. See, for example, Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001) or Epifani and Gancia (2009).
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2.5 Equilibrium
The optimal pricing rules (11), the good market clearing condition for Home’s differentiated
varieties (18), the labor market clearing condition (20), the corresponding conditions for Foreign,
and the balanced trade condition (21), together with the expressions for the price indices, fully
characterize the equilibrium of the economy.
It is possible to solve this system explicitly for NH and NF as functions of the trade policy
instruments:
NH =
L(A2H − A1F )
A2FA2H − A1HA1F NF =
L(A2F − A1H)
A2FA2H − A1HA1F , (22)
where A1H , A2H , A1F and A2F are non-linear functions of Home policy instruments ΛH ≡
{τCH , τIH , τXH} and Foreign policy instruments ΛF ≡ {τCF , τIF , τXF}. The expressions for
these coefficients, as well as the derivation of the equilibrium allocation, can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
Let the superscript FT denote the market allocation in the absence of trade policies (free
trade allocation). We already showed that production of each differentiated variety is fixed,
thus for both countries yFT = (ε − 1)f . Given the assumption of symmetric countries, the
equilibrium allocation is symmetric too and (22) simplifies to NFT = αL
εf
. In the next section
we compare the free trade allocation with the first-best allocation. We then lay out the general
structure of the policy makers’ problems and discuss the incentives that determine their trade
policy choices.
3 Trade Policy
3.1 The First-Best Allocation
The first-best allocation constitutes the natural benchmark to which one can compare the
equilibrium outcomes under different policy regimes. The social planner chooses an allocation
that maximizes total world welfare subject to the technology constraints and full employment
14
in each country.13
max
CH ,CF ,ZH ,ZF
CαHZ
1−α
H + C
α
FZ
1−α
F (23)
subject to (10), (13), (17), QZH + QZF = ZH + ZF , L = LCH + LZH , the definitions of
consumption indices and the corresponding constraints for Foreign.
Proposition 1 presents the solution to this problem and compares it with the free trade alloca-
tion:14
Proposition 1: First-Best Allocation. The first-best allocation entails the same firm size
but more varieties than the free trade allocation. Formally,
(1) yFB = f(ε− 1) = yFT and NFB = αL
(ε−1+α)f > N
FT = αL
εf
.
This result replicates Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)’s finding that the market provides optimal firm
size but too little variety. Because of monopolistic competition in the differentiated sector,
individual free trade prices are too high. As a consequence, there is too little demand for
the differentiated goods and thus too little entry. Therefore, the free trade equilibrium is
characterized by a production inefficiency : both countries would be better off by simultaneously
shifting some of their labor force from the homogenous sector to the differentiated sector.
3.2 Optimal Policy Problems
We now turn to the description of the optimal policy problems. We consider three policy
instruments: production, import and export taxes. First, we assume that policy makers choose
only one policy instrument at a time and subsequently we let them choose all three policy
instruments simultaneously. For each case, we study cooperative and non-cooperative policies.
Note that given Cobb-Douglas utility, Home welfare, represented by the indirect utility func-
tion, can be written as:
VH(PH(ΛH ,ΛF ), IH(ΛH ,ΛF )) = −α log (PH(ΛH ,ΛF )) + log (IH(ΛH ,ΛF )) (24)
13More generally, there exists a whole set of Pareto-efficient allocations such that no country can be made
better off, without making the other one worse off, which can be traced out by varying the welfare weights in
the planner problem. We choose the point on the frontier that corresponds to equal weights of both countries
because we always study symmetric allocations, which seems natural given that both countries are identical.
14All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
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where PH and IH are functions of the policy instruments ΛH and ΛF .
The cooperative policy maker chooses Home and Foreign trade policy instruments in order to
maximize total world welfare, which is given by the sum of Home and Foreign indirect utility:
max
λH ,λF
VH(PH(ΛH ,ΛF ), IH(ΛH ,ΛF )) + VF (PF (ΛH ,ΛF ), IF (ΛH ,ΛF )) (25)
where λj ∈ {τCj, τIj, τXj,Λj}. Differently, the single-country policy maker chooses the domestic
trade policy instruments ΛH in order to maximize Home welfare, given the level of the Foreign
trade policy instruments:
max
λH
VH(PH(ΛH ,ΛF ), IH(ΛH ,ΛF )) (26)
where again λH ∈ {τCH , τIH , τXH ,ΛH}.
3.3 Policy Makers’ Incentives
Next, we decompose welfare changes in order to reveal policy makers’ incentives to set policy
instruments.15 Remember that domestic income is given by labor income plus transfers:
IH = L+ TH = L+ (τIH − 1)ττXFPFFCHF + (τXH − 1)τPHHCFH + (τCH − 1)NH(y + f),
which, using the labor and goods market clearing conditions, can be rewritten as:
IH = (ZH + PHCH) + (τXHτPHHCFH − ττXFPFFCHF +QZH − ZH) (27)
The terms in the first bracket equal domestic expenditure and the remaining terms are net
exports at international prices (i.e., the trade balance). While welfare can in principle be
decomposed in many ways, the decomposition of welfare changes exposed in Helpman and
Krugman (1989), chapter one, turns out to be particularly useful for our purposes. In particular,
they show that changes in indirect utility induced by changes in the trade policy instruments can
be split into: terms-of-trade effects; gains from improved production composition; consumption-
wedges.16 Totally differentiating (24), and using the above expression for income, the change
15All derivations can be found in Appendix C.
16In chapter 1, page 23, they show that dV (pC ,I)∂V
∂I
= −(C − X)dp∗ + p∗dX + (pc − p∗)dC, where C is the
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in domestic welfare can be expressed as:
dVH = −αdPH
PH
+
dIH
IH
(28)
= −αdPH
PH
+ α
dPH
PH
+
d(τXHPHH)τCFH − d(τXFPFF )τCHF
IH
+
(τXHτCH
ε
ε−1 − 1)(y + f)dNH
IH
+
(1− τXH)PHHdCHH + (τIH − 1)ττXFPFFdCHF
IH
Here, the first term is the change in welfare due to changes in the domestic price level, which is
exactly compensated by the first term of the income derivative. Thus, the change in domestic
welfare is actually function of three terms, like in Helpman and Krugman (1989). A first
implication of (28) is that in general equilibrium, domestic policy makers do not try to reduce
the domestic price level via the home market externality (as described in equation (15)) because
they internalize that in terms of utility, any reduction in the domestic price level is always
exactly compensated by a simultaneous reduction in domestic income. Note that if lump sum
transfers/taxes are not allowed for, like for example when taxes are considered to be a pure
waste (as is the case in Venables (1987) or Ossa (2011)17), income is simply constant and given
by IH = L. This implies that dVH = −αdPHPH . In this case, a reduction in the domestic price
level is not associated with a change in income, and therefore policy makers do have incentives
to reduce the domestic price level by exploiting the home market externality.
The terms in the second line represent consumption-based terms-of-trade effects. They consist
of changes in the international price of the differentiated export bundle times exports minus
the change in the international price of the differentiated import bundle times imports.18 An
increase in the price of exportables raises welfare, while an increase in the price of importables
reduces it. The change in the international price of the export and import bundle can be further
consumption vector, X is the production vector, pc is the vector of consumer prices and p
∗ is the vector of
international prices. ”The first term on the right-hand side represents the gain from improved terms of trade
[...] The second term represents the gain from an improved production composition. [...] The last term represents
the consumption-wedge effect.”
17He uses this assumption for the analytical results. He only considers the more general case in a simulation
exercise.
18The international price of the homogeneous good does not change and thus drops from this expression.
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decomposed as:
d(τXHPHH) =
ε
ε− 1N
− 1
ε−1
H d(τXHτCH)−
τXHτCH
ε− 1
ε
ε− 1N
− ε
ε−1
H dNH (29)
d(τXFPFF ) =
ε
ε− 1N
− 1
ε−1
F d(τXF τCF )−
τXF τCF
ε− 1
ε
ε− 1N
− ε
ε−1
F dNF
Thus, consumption-based terms of trade improve directly through increases in τXH and τCH ,
which make exports more expensive, and through reductions in τXF and τCF , which make
imports cheaper. This is the traditional direct terms-of-trade effect. Moreover, consumption-
based terms of trade improve indirectly through reductions in NH and increases in NF because
they increase the international price of exports and lower the international price of imports of
one unit of the respective sub-utility. In this sense, import taxes can also have indirect terms-
of-trade effects by changing the number of varieties produced in each country. Finally, note
that an increase in NH or a reduction in NF cannot be interpreted as a home market externality
because both are welfare reducing, whereas positive welfare effects of such changes would be
required to make them interpretable as such.
The term in the third line represents what Helpman and Krugman (1989) refer to as ’gain
from an improved production composition’. We label this the production efficiency effect. It
represents the trade off between producing one more variety of the differentiated good and
giving up LH(i) = y + f units of QZH , evaluated at international prices.
19 The production
efficiency effect is zero when τXHτCH =
ε−1
ε
, i.e., when production and/or export subsidies are
set so as to eliminate the price markup charged by domestic firms. When this is the case, there
are no efficiency gains from relocating labor from one sector to the other. In contrast – as
shown in section 3.1 – at the free trade allocation there is too little provision of differentiated
varieties and too much production of the homogenous good. In this case, the production
efficiency term equals ε
ε−1fdNH , implying that policy makers have an incentive to induce a
reallocation of labor from the homogenous to the differentiated sector. Given that a relocation
of firms to the domestic economy will exactly achieve this goal, they have an incentive to use
trade policy to induce this outcome. However, observe that such relocation motive is no longer
present once production efficiency has been reached. Indeed, the term becomes negative if the
subsidies exceed the price markup i.e., whenever there is over-subsidizing further increasing NH
19Indeed, in equilibrium, dNH = −εfdQZH .
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reduces welfare. This term will be crucial to understand the policy outcomes of the different
instruments.
Finally, the terms in the last line represent consumption wedges due to import or export
taxes. By generating a differences between domestic and international prices, trade taxes induce
domestic households to consume too little or too much of Foreign or domestic differentiated
goods. A tariff, for instance, renders Foreign varieties too expensive for domestic households
and generates an inefficiency by lowering CHF . Hence, as long as τIH > 1, any increase in the
Home demand for Foreign differentiated goods partially corrects for this distortion and raises
welfare. On the other hand, an export subsidy increases the demand of foreigners for Home
varieties and reduces that of domestic households. As a result, CHH is inefficiently low and as
long as τXH < 1, an increase in the domestic demand for Home differentiated goods is welfare
improving. Observe that these terms are zero when there are no trade taxes like, for example,
at the free trade allocation or when production taxes are the only instruments. In fact, in the
absence of trade taxes, domestic and international prices are equal and consumption wedges
are absent.20
4 Production Taxes
In this section we study cooperative and non-cooperative production subsidies/taxes, assuming
that they are the only available policy instruments, i.e., τIH = τIF = τXH = τXF = 1. We first
discuss cooperative production taxes and then turn to a discussion of strategic ones.
Proposition 2: Cooperative Production Subsidy. The optimal cooperative production
subsidy is set to exactly offset the price markup generated by monopolistic competition. This
subsidy implements a symmetric equilibrium with the first-best number of varieties. Formally,
(1) τCoopC =
ε−1
ε
and NCoop = NFB.
To gain intuition for the incentives behind such policy outcome, it is useful to express the
20Helpman and Krugman (1989) pointed out that whenever the trade tax τmj is close to one, the consumption-
wedge effect is second order in size and can even be disregarded. Nonetheless, we always account for those effects
in our welfare decomposition.
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cooperative welfare changes using (28) for both countries:
dVH + dVF =
(τCH
ε
ε−1 − 1)(y + f)dNH
IH
+
(τCF
ε
ε−1 − 1)(y + f)dNF
IF
(30)
where dNH =
∂NH
∂τCH
dτCH +
∂NH
∂τCF
dτCF and dNF =
∂NF
∂τCF
dτCF +
∂NF
∂τCH
dτCH . Under cooperation,
the common authority takes into account the externality produced on the other country, so
that consumption-based terms-of-trade effects exactly compensate since they are equal and of
opposite signs. Moreover, when production taxes are the only instrument, consumption wedges
are absent. Therefore, the production efficiency effect is the only driving incentive of the
cooperative policy maker. The cooperative welfare is increasing in the two subsidies (dNH > 0,
dNF > 0)
21 as long as ε−1
ε
< τCoopC ≤ 1, and is maximized for τCoopC = ε−1ε .
Differently, unilateral setting of production taxes does not lead to the first-best outcome due
to the consumption-based terms-of-trade externality, as formally stated in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: Unilaterally Set Production Subsidies. The optimal unilateral deviation
entails a reduction in the production subsidy when starting from the efficient allocation. When
starting from the free trade allocation, the optimal unilateral deviation entails a production
subsidy. Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, ∂VH
∂τCH
> 0.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1,
∂VH
∂τCH
< 0.
Using our welfare decomposition, welfare changes induced by unilateral production taxes are
given by:
dVH =
d(PHH)τCFH − d(PFF )τCHF
IH
+
(τCH
ε
ε−1 − 1)(y + f)dNH
IH
, (31)
where dPHH and dPFF can be further decomposed as in (29), and dNH =
∂NH
∂τCH
dτCH . Thus,
single-country policy makers’ actions are determined both by the consumption-based terms-of-
trade effect (first term) and the production efficiency effect (second term). There is a trade off
between these two effects: terms-of-trade effects call for a production tax which improves terms
21See Lemma A1 (1) in Appendix D for the proof of the incentives driving cooperative policy choice.
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of trade both directly – by increasing the international price of individual varieties (direct terms-
of-trade effect) – and indirectly – by reducing the number of domestically produced varieties.
Instead, the production efficiency effect warrants a production subsidy that increases domestic
entry and brings factory gate prices down to marginal costs.22 Overall, this trade off leads to a
production subsidy which, however, is inefficiently small. Note also that any production subsidy
that is larger than the first-best level would be clearly welfare detrimental because it would
make both terms-of-trade and production efficiency effects negative. This intuition carries over
to strategically set production taxes, as stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Nash-Equilibrium Production Subsidies. In the Nash equilibrium both
countries set a production subsidy. However, this subsidy is smaller than the one needed to
implement the first-best allocation. The equilibrium number of varieties larger than in the free
trade allocation, but lower than the first-best level. Formally,
(1) τ coopC < τ
Nash
C < 1 and N
FT < NNash < NFB.
Thus, single-country policy makers never over-subsidize domestic production, as would be
required if the home market externality were the dominating incentive for non-cooperative
policy choice. Instead, the trade off between production efficiency effects and terms-of-trade
effects leads policy makers to choose an inefficiently low level of production subsidies. This is an
important result, because it contradicts the standard wisdom that in the two-sector Krugman
model countries have an incentive to over-subsidize production in order to attract more firms
(Venables (1987)).
5 Import Taxes
Here, we assume that the only strategic trade policy instrument available is an import tar-
iff/subsidy. Given the results of the previous section, where we pointed out the importance of
the production efficiency effect, we study cooperative and non-cooperative import taxes under
two scenarios. In the first scenario, production subsidies have already been set in a non-strategic
fashion such as to eliminate monopolistic distortions and to implement the first-best allocation
22See Lemmata A1 (2) and A1 (3) in Appendix D for the proofs of the incentives driving unilateral deviations.
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(i.e., τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
and production efficiency effects are absent), while in the second scenario
monopolistic distortions are present (i.e., τCH = τCF = 1). Let us first study the cooperative
policy maker’s problem.
Proposition 4: Cooperative Import Subsidy. If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, the cooperative policy
maker refrains from using taxes on imports and the number of varieties equals the first-best
level. If τCH = τCF = 1, the cooperative policy maker finds it optimal to subsidize imports.
The number of varieties is larger than in the free trade allocation, but remains lower than the
first-best level. Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then τCoopI = 1 and N
Coop = NFB.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then
ε−1
ε
< τCoopI < 1 and N
FT < NCoop < NFB.
Again, we can use (28) for both countries to decompose the cooperative welfare change:
dVH + dVF =
(τCH
ε
ε−1 − 1)(y + f)dNH
IH
+
(τCF
ε
ε−1 − 1)(y + f)dNF
IF
(32)
+
(τIH − 1)τPFFdCHF
IH
+
(τIF − 1)τPHHdCFH
IF
,
where dNH =
∂NH
∂τIH
dτIH +
∂NH
∂τIF
dτIF , dNF =
∂NF
∂τIF
dτIF +
∂NF
∂τIH
dτIH , dCHF =
∂CHF
∂τIH
dτIH +
∂CHF
∂τIF
dτIF
and dCFH =
∂CFH
∂τIF
dτIF +
∂CFH
∂τIH
dτIH . Thus, the cooperative welfare change can be decomposed
into the production efficiency effect (first line) and consumption wedges (second line). Observe
that when production subsidies are set at the first-best level, τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, the terms related
to production efficiency are zero. In this case, setting τIH = τIF = 1, also makes consumption
wedges disappear and this solves the cooperative import policy problem. Differently, when
production subsidies are not available, i.e., τCH = τCF = 1, the production efficiency effect is
positive and an increase in domestic and foreign varieties (dNH > 0, dNF > 0) increases welfare.
To achieve that, the cooperative policy maker has an incentive to implement symmetric import
subsidies in both countries, which increase the demand for imported varieties and trigger entry
into the differentiated sectors in both countries. However, this comes at the cost of creating
wedges: the domestic price of imported varieties becomes lower than its international price
and this tilts the consumption allocation inefficiently towards imported varieties. This can be
clearly seen from the above formula. When τIH = τIF < 1, the terms (τIj − 1) are negative so
22
that an increase in consumption of imported varieties induced by import subsidies (dCHF > 0,
dCFH > 0) reduces welfare.
23 As a result, when only import taxes are available, production
and consumption inefficiencies cannot be eliminated simultaneously and the cooperative import
subsidy implements a second-best allocation.
Once we move to the case of non-cooperation, trade policy outcomes crucially depend on
whether production efficiency effects are present, as stated formally by Lemma 2 for the case
of unilateral import taxes.
Lemma 2: Unilaterally Set Import Tariffs/Subsidies. Let τIH = τIF = 1. The opti-
mal unilateral deviation entails an import subsidy when starting from the first-best allocation
implemented by a production subsidy, and an import tariff when starting from the free trade
allocation. Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then ∂VH
∂τIH
< 0.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then
∂VH
∂τIH
> 0.
To understand this difference in import policy choice, we use once more our welfare decompo-
sition (28):
dVH =
d(PHH)τCFH − d(PFF )τCHF
IH
+
(τCH
ε
ε−1 − 1)(y + f)dNH
IH
(33)
where dPHH and dPFF can be further decomposed as in (29) and dNH =
∂NH
∂τIH
dτIH . Consump-
tion wedges are absent since τIH = τIF = 1 and the change in domestic welfare induced by
changes in unilateral import taxes is given by consumption-based terms-of-trade effects (first
term) and production efficiency effects (second term). When τCH =
ε−1
ε
, there are no produc-
tion efficiency effects and import taxes have only indirect consumption-based terms-of-trade
effects through their effect on the number of varieties produced in each country. The optimal
unilateral policy choice is an import subsidy which shifts domestic demand towards imported
varieties. This triggers exit of firms from the domestic differentiated sector and entry in Foreign,
thereby indirectly improving domestic consumption-based terms of trade.
In contrast, at the free trade allocation with τCH = τCF = 1, both consumption-based terms-
of-trade effects and production efficiency effects are present. While the first one calls for an
23See Lemma A2 (1) in Appendix E for the proof of the incentives driving cooperative policy choice.
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import subsidy, which indirectly improves domestic terms of trade, the second one warrants a
tariff. This is so because a unilaterally set tariff shifts domestic demand towards domestically
produced varieties and triggers entry into the domestic differentiated sector, where domestic
firms now make profits, at the expense of the Foreign differentiated sector, where Foreign firms
now make losses. As a result, the domestic price level is reduced by entry and the Foreign
one increases through exit, restoring zero profits in equilibrium. This relocation of firms from
Foreign to Home allows Home to shift labor from the homogeneous to the differentiated sector,
thus increasing domestic production efficiency at the expense of the other country (dNH > 0
and dNF < 0).
24 Overall, the production efficiency effect dominates the indirect terms-of-trade
effect and the outcome is a tariff. Thus, while production efficiency is the reason for the tariff,
a relocation externality is the means by which production efficiency gains are achieved.
Our finding for the case τCH = τCF = 1 is in line with Venables (1987)’s and Ossa (2011)’s
results that in absence of retaliation import tariffs can increase domestic welfare compared
to a situation with free trade. What is different is the interpretation. According to their
interpretation, the home market externality – defined as the desire to reduce the domestic price
level via reduced transport costs that are achieved by relocating firms from the Foreign to
the domestic economy – is the only incentive driving unilateral import policy choices. Both
Venables (1987) and Ossa (2011) consider tariff income as a pure waste. In this special case, the
motive to reduce the price index is indeed the only incentive for policy makers because effects
of tariffs on income – and thus terms-of-trade effects – are absent. Instead, we have shown
that when allowing for transfers, it is the desire to increase production efficiency which drives
incentives to relocate firms to the domestic economy. Thus, it is the production efficiency effect
which implies a relocation externality. Observe that this is not a purely semantic difference.
The relocation externality is in general only present when the initial allocation is inefficient.
Just in the special case when income effects are not allowed for, the relocation externality is
always present. The next Proposition shows that the results for unilateral case extend to a
setting with strategic choice of import taxes.
Proposition 5: Nash-Equilibrium Import Tariffs/Subsidies. When starting from the
first-best allocation, the Nash-equilibrium policy consists of an import subsidy, implying more
24See Lemmata A2 (2) and A2 (3) in Appendix E for the proofs of the incentives driving unilateral deviations.
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varieties than the first-best allocation. In contrast, when starting from the free trade alloca-
tion, the Nash-equilibrium entails a tariff, implying less varieties than the free trade allocation.
Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then τNashI < 1 and N
FT < NFB < NNash.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then there exists a τ
Nash
I > 1 such that N
Nash < NFT < NFB.
First, note that on top of the production efficiency effect and terms-of-trade effect described
in Lemma 2, in the Nash equilibrium import taxes also generate consumption wedges. How-
ever, the Nash outcomes are exactly the ones we would have expected from the incentives for
unilateral deviations. When starting from the first-best allocation, the optimal Nash policy is
an import subsidy. The intuition follows from the incentives for unilateral policies: the import
subsidy aims at improving consumption-based domestic terms of trade indirectly by reducing
the number of domestic firms. Yet, in equilibrium no country reaches this aim and entry in-
creases beyond efficiency. According to the second part of Proposition 5, when there is no
correction of the monopolistic distortion, non-cooperative trade policy brings about a positive
tariff. From Lemma 2 (2) we know that the production efficiency effect is behind the choice
of setting a unilateral import tariff. However, in the Nash equilibrium no country manages to
relocate firms to its domestic market thereby failing to increase production efficiency. Instead,
tariffs reduce the world equilibrium number of varieties.
6 Export Taxes
In this section, we consider export subsidies/taxes as the only strategic trade policy instrument
available. In line with the previous analysis, we study cooperative and Nash policies under two
scenarios. In the first one production subsidies have been set such as to implement the first-best
allocation (i.e., τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
), while in the second scenario monopolistic distortions have
not been corrected (i.e., τCH = τCF = 1).
Proposition 6: Cooperative Export Subsidy. If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, the cooperative policy
maker refrains from using taxes on exports and the number of varieties equals the first-best
level. If τCH = τCF = 1, the cooperative policy maker finds it optimal to subsidize exports.
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The number of varieties is larger than in the free trade allocation, but remains lower than the
first-best level. Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then τCoopX = 1 and N
Coop = NFB.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then τ
Coop
X < 1 and N
FT < NCoop < NFB.
Incentives to set export subsidies can again be best understood using the welfare decomposition
(28), which now becomes
dVH + dVF =
(τXHτCH
ε
ε−1 − 1)(y + f)dNH
IH
+
(τXF τCF
ε
ε−1 − 1)(y + f)dNF
IF
(34)
+
(1− τXH)PHHdCHH
IH
+
(1− τXF )PFFdCFF
IF
,
where dNH =
∂NH
∂τXH
dτXH +
∂NH
∂τXF
dτXF , dNF =
∂NF
∂τXH
dτXH +
∂NF
∂τXF
dτXF , dCHH =
∂CHH
∂τXH
dτXH +
∂CHH
∂τXF
dτXF and dCFF =
∂CFF
∂τXH
dτXH +
∂CFF
∂τXF
dτXF . Terms in the first line of (34) are production
efficiency effects while terms in the second line are consumption wedges. When production
subsidies are set at their first-best level, i.e., τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, it is easy to see that both
production efficiency effects and consumption wedges are zero if τXH = τXF = 1. In contrast,
when no production subsidies are available i.e., τCH = τCF = 1, production efficiency can be
improved by setting export subsidies in both countries, which increase demand for differentiated
varieties and trigger entry into the differentiated sectors (dNH > 0, dNF > 0).
25 However, this
comes at the cost of creating consumption wedges. As for the case of import subsidies, this
trade off leads to a second-best outcome, which improves upon the free trade allocation but
does not eliminate all distortions. We now turn to a discussion of non-cooperative export taxes.
Lemma 3: Unilaterally Set Export Taxes/Subsidies. Let τXH = τXF = 1. The optimal
unilateral deviation entails an export tax when starting from the first-best allocation implemented
by a production subsidy, and an export subsidy when starting from the free trade allocation.
Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then ∂VH
∂τXH
> 0.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then
∂VH
∂τXH
< 0.
25See Lemma A3 (1) in Appendix F for the proof of the incentives driving cooperative policy choices.
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Once again, we use our welfare decomposition (28):
dVH =
d(τXHPHH)τCFH − d(τXFPFF )τCHF
IH
+
(τXHτCH
ε
ε−1 − 1)(y + f)dNH
IH
(35)
where d(τXHPHH) and d(τXFPFF ) can be further decomposed as in (29) and dNH =
∂NH
∂τXH
dτXH .
The first term in (35) is the consumption based terms-of-trade effect, while the second term is
the production efficiency effect. When τCH =
ε−1
ε
, production efficiency effects are absent as
long as τXH = 1. However, policy makers have incentives to unilaterally deviate by setting a
small export tax. Such an export tax indeed improves domestic terms of trade both directly,
through an increase in the international price of domestically produced varieties, and indirectly,
via a reduction in the number of domestic firms and an increase in the number of foreign ones.
Differently, at the free trade allocation with τCH = τCF = 1 production efficiency effects
are present and call for an export subsidy.26 Overall, negative terms-of-trade effects of an
export subsidy are out-weighted by production efficiency gains. A small export subsidy triggers
entry into the domestic differentiated sector, thereby improving domestic production efficiency.
This creates a relocation externality, since it induces exit of firms from Foreign. However,
the relocation effect is just the means to increase domestic production efficiency. The next
Proposition shows that the results on unilateral changes extend to a setup with strategic choice
of the export policy instrument.
Proposition 7: Nash-Equilibrium Export Taxes/Subsidies. When starting from the
first-best allocation, the Nash-equilibrium policy consists of an export tax, implying less varieties
than the first-best allocation. In contrast, when starting from the free trade allocation, the Nash
equilibrium entails an export subsidy, implying more varieties than the free trade allocation.
Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then τNashX > 1 and N
Nash < NFB.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then τ
Nash
X < 1 and N
FT < NNash < NFB.
Proposition 7 makes it clear that in this case too, the outcome of the policy game depends
crucially on whether the initial allocation is (in)efficient. When starting from the free trade
26See Lemmata A3 (2) and A3 (3) in Appendix F for the proofs of the incentives driving unilateral deviations.
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allocation the optimal Nash policy is an export subsidy, whereas when starting from the first-
best allocation the optimal non-cooperative policy is an export tax. Again, even though the
export taxes/subsidies will induce consumption wedges in the Nash equilibrium, the intuition is
the one provided for the unilateral policy choice. If the initial allocation is efficient consumption-
based terms-of-trade effects call for an export tax, but in the Nash outcome both countries fail
to improve their terms of trade. If instead the initial allocation is inefficient, the production
efficiency effect prevails and the policy makers choose an export subsidy.
7 Simultaneous Policy Choice
Finally, in this section we allow for simultaneous choice of all three policy instruments.
Proposition 8: Cooperative Policy Instruments. The cooperative policy maker sets the
first-best level of production subsidies and chooses the trade taxes such that τCoopI · τCoopX = 1.
The number of varieties equals the first-best level.
(1) τCoopC =
ε−1
ε
, τCoopI · τCoopX = 1 and NCoop = NFB.
This result is straightforward: the cooperative policy maker uses the production subsidy
to reach the first-best allocation and either refrains from using trade instruments (τCoopI =
τCoopX = 1), or uses them in a way that does not create consumption wedges (τ
Coop
I · τCoopX = 1).
Differently, non-cooperative policy makers intend to manipulate international prices in their
favor.
Proposition 9: Nash-Equilibrium Policy Instruments. The Nash-equilibrium policy con-
sists of the first-best level of production subsidies, and inefficient import subsidies and export
taxes. Formally,
(1) τNashC = τ
Coop
C =
ε−1
ε
, τNashI < 1 and τ
Nash
X > 1.
The result that production subsidies are set so as to completely offset monopolistic distortions
is an application of the principle of targeting in public economics (Dixit (1985)). It states that
an externality or distortion is best countered with a tax instrument that acts directly on the
appropriate margin. Only when such an instrument is not available, trade policy can be used
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as a second-best policy. This confirms that the inefficiency of the market allocation crucially
affects policy makers’ incentives to set import tariffs or export subsidies. Once uncoordinated
policy makers have all the necessary instruments to eliminate these distortions, the only motive
to set trade policy is the incentive to improve domestic terms of trade. Export taxes achieve this
directly by increasing the international price of domestic varieties and indirectly by reducing
the number of domestically produced varieties, while import tariffs only impact on terms of
trade through this indirect channel.27 Moreover, this finding also strengthens the results from
the previous sections, where first-best production subsidies were set in a non-strategic fashion
and confirms our approach to isolate efficiency considerations from other motives to set trade
policy.
Finally, note that our finding that terms-of-trade effects are the dominating motive for trade
policy in the Krugman model is closely related to Bagwell and Staiger (2009) who derive a very
similar result for the case where countries can set import and export taxes simultaneously but
do not have access to production taxes. They find that countries’ best response to an import
tariff would be to set an offsetting export subsidy, and thus the relocation motive is not present
in the incentives that determine Nash-equilibrium policy choice. Instead, only terms-of-trade
effects survive. This is in line with our result that when additionally production subsidies
are available, they will be set to the first-best level while the trade instruments are driven by
terms-of-trade effects.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied cooperative, unilateral and strategic trade policies in a two-sector
Krugman (1980) model of intra-industry trade, considering production, import and export taxes
as trade policy instruments. It is common wisdom that in this model non-cooperative trade
policies are set in order to try to agglomerate firms in the domestic economy, which reduces
transport costs for domestic consumers and thus the domestic price level (home market effect).
Contrary to the results of the previous literature, we show that in this model the home market
effect is not a motive for non-cooperative trade policy choices. Instead, they are driven by pro-
27It is easy to show that using both trade instruments unilaterally improves terms of trade by more than
when relying only on a single one.
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duction efficiency considerations, on the one hand, and by consumption-based terms-of-trade
effects on the other. Indeed, due to monopolistic competition, in the free trade equilibrium
there are too few firms in the differentiated sector and this affects policy makers’ incentives
in a crucial way. Thus, when production taxes are available, non-cooperative policy makers
increase production efficiency by setting production subsidies. However, due to terms-of-trade
effects these subsidies are lower than the cooperatively set ones. When only import (export)
tax instruments are available, non-cooperative policy makers use tariffs (export subsidies) to
increase production efficiency, thereby imposing a relocation externality on the other country.
However, once monopolistic distortions have been offset by appropriate production subsidies,
results turn around: policy makers set import subsidies (export taxes), which improve domes-
tic consumption-based terms of trade. Finally, when policy makers can set all three policy
instruments simultaneously, they choose to set production subsidies, which exactly offset mo-
nopolistic distortions. Moreover, they set import subsidies and export taxes, both of which aim
at improving domestic terms of trade. The implications of our findings are important: also in
the Krugman (1980) model, terms-of-trade externalities remain the only reason why countries
need to sign trade agreements.
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APPENDIX
A Equilibrium
A.1 Equilibrium Allocation and Prices
Substituting the optimal pricing rules (11) and (12) into the definition of Home (6) (and Foreign)
aggregate price indices we obtain:
PH =
ε
ε− 1
[
NHτ
1−ε
CH +NF (τIHτXF ττCF )
1−ε] 11−ε PF = ε
ε− 1
[
NF τ
1−ε
CF +NH (τIF τXHττCH)
1−ε] 11−ε
(36)
Combining the market clearing condition (18) with the analogous one for Foreign and substi-
tuting out the expressions for the prices (36), gives:
CH =
fP−εH (ε− 1)
(
ε
ε−1
) ε
τ ε[−ττ εCF + (ττCHτIF τXH)ε](τIHτXF )ε
τ 2ε(τIF τXHτIHτXF )ε − τ 2 (37)
CF =
fP−εF (ε− 1)
(
ε
ε−1
) ε
τ ε[−ττ εCH + (ττCF τIHτXF )ε](τIF τXH)ε
τ 2ε(τIF τXHτIF τXF )ε − τ 2 (38)
Using the trade balance condition (21), the labor market clearing condition (20), the equivalent
equations for Foreign, and the expressions for CH , CF , PH and PF just derived, we obtain the
following system of equations in NH and NF :
A1HNH + A2HNF − L = 0 (39)
A2FNH + A1FNF − L = 0 (40)
The solution to this system is:
NH =
L(A2H − A1F )
A2FA2H − A1HA1F NF =
L(A2F − A1H)
A2FA2H − A1HA1F (41)
where:
A1H =
fετ−εCHτ
2ε(τCHτIHτIF τXHτXF )
ε(α + (1− α)τCH)
α(τ 2ε(τIHτIF τXHτXF )ε − τ 2) (42)
+
fετ−εCHτ [αττ
ε
CH(τCHτXH − 1)− τCH(ττCF τIHτXF )ε(1− α + ατXH)]
α(τ 2ε(τIHτIF τXHτXF )ε − τ 2)
A2H =
fεττXF τ
1−ε
CF (−α− (1− α)τIH)[ττ εCF − (ττCHτIF τXH)ε]
α(τ 2ε(τIHτIF τXHτXF )ε − τ 2) (43)
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A1F =
fετ−εCF τ
2ε(τCF τIHτIF τXτXF )
ε(α + (1− α)τCF )
α(τ 2ε(τIHτIF τXHτXF )ε − τ 2) (44)
+
fετ−εCF τ [αττ
ε
CF (τCF τXF − 1)− τCF (ττCHτIF τXH)ε(1− α + ατXF )]
α(τ 2ε(τIHτIF τXHτXF )ε − τ 2)
A2F =
fεττXHτ
1−ε
CH (−α− (1− α)τIF )[ττ εCH − (ττCF τIHτXF )ε]
α(τ 2ε(τIHτIF τXHτXF )ε − τ 2) (45)
A.2 Free Trade Allocation
Let τCH = τCF = τIH = τIF = τXH = τXF = 1. Then (41) simplifies to:
NH = NF =
αL
εf
≡ NFT (46)
B The Planner’s Problem
Proposition 1: First-Best Allocation. The first-best allocation entails the same firm size
but more varieties than the free trade allocation. Formally,
(1) yFB = f(ε− 1) = yFT and NFB = αL
(ε−1+α)f > N
FT = αL
εf
.
Proof of Proposition 1.
The Lagrangian for the planner’s problem is:
L =
[∫ NH
0
cHH(i)
ε−1
ε di+
∫ NF
0
cHF (i)
ε−1
ε di
] εα
ε−1
Z1−αH +
[∫ NF
0
cFH(i)
ε−1
ε di+
∫ NF
0
cFF (i)
ε−1
ε di
] εα
ε−1
Z1−αF
+
∫ NH
0
λ1(i)[LCH(i)− f − cHH(i)− τcFH(i)]di+
∫ NF
0
λ2(i)[LCF (i)− f − cFF (i)− τcHF (i)]di
+ λ3[LH + LF −
∫ NH
0
LCH(i)di−
∫ NF
0
LCF (i)di− ZH − ZF ]
The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂cHH(i)
= 0 : αCαH
[∫ NH
0
cHH(i)
ε−1
ε di+
∫ NF
0
cHF (i)
ε−1
ε di
]−1
Z1−αH cHH(i)
−1
ε = λ1(i) (47)
∂L
∂cHF (i)
= 0 : αCαH
[∫ NH
0
cHH(i)
ε−1
ε di+
∫ NF
0
cHF (i)
ε−1
ε di
]−1
Z1−αH cHF (i)
−1
ε = τλ2(i) (48)
∂L
∂ZH
= 0 : (1− α)CαHZ−αH = λ3 (49)
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∂L
∂LCH(i)
= 0 : λ1(i) = λ3 (50)
∂L
∂NH
= 0 :α
ε
ε− 1
{
CαHZ
1−α
H
[∫ NH
0
cHH(i)
ε−1
ε di+
∫ NF
0
cHF (i)
ε−1
ε di
]−1
cHH(NH)
ε−1
ε +
CαFZ
1−α
F
[∫ NH
0
cFH(i)
ε−1
ε di+
∫ NF
0
cFF (i)
ε−1
ε di
]−1
cFH(NH)
ε−1
ε
}
= λ3LCH(NH),
(51)
where in the last condition we have already used the fact that λ1(NH)[LCH(NH)−f−cHH(NH)−
τcFH(NH)] = 0.
The first-order conditions with respect to Foreign variables are completely symmetric and are
thus omitted for the sake of space. By imposing symmetry we find λ1(i) = λ2(i). Combining
(47) and (48) we obtain:
cHF (i) = cHH(i)τ
−ε (52)
Combining (47), (50) and (51) we get that:
ε
ε− 1[cHH(i)
ε−1
ε + cHF (i)
ε−1
ε ] = LCH(i)cHH(i)
1
ε (53)
Combining (52) and (53), we obtain:
cHH(i) =
ε
ε− 1[1 + τ
1−ε]−1 (54)
Substituting the expression for cHH(i) and cHF (i) into the resource condition for domestic
varieties LCH(i) = f+cHH(i)+τcFH(i), we get LCH(i) = εf and using the production function
yH(i) = LCH(i) − f we obtain yFB = (ε − 1)f . Moreover, cFBHH(i) = (ε − 1)f [1 + τ 1−ε]−1 and
cFBHF (i) = (ε− 1)fτ−ε[1 + τ 1−ε]−1.
Using the resource condition for ZH , we get ZH = L − NHεf . Finally, combining (47), (49)
and (50):
(1− α)C
ε−1
ε
H = αZHcHH(i)
− 1
ε (55)
Substituting the expressions for ZH , CH , c
FB
HH(i) and c
FB
HF (i) into (55), we can solve for NH =
NF ≡ NFB = αLf(ε+α−1) .
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C Derivation of the Welfare Decomposition
In this section we decompose the welfare change due to a change in the policy instruments
following Helpman and Krugman (1989). Totally differentiating indirect utility, we have:
dVH = −αdPH
PH
+
dIH
IH
(56)
Domestic income is given by labor income plus transfers:
IH = LH +TH = LH +(τIH−1)ττXFPFFCHF +(τXH−1)τPHHCFH +(τCH−1)NH(y+f) (57)
Note that:
(i) From labor market clearing it follows that LH = QZH +NH(y + f);
(ii) From optimal pricing we have τIHττXFPFF = PHF ;
(iii) τCHNH(y + f)− τPHHCFH = PHHCHH given that:
– From pHH(i) = τCH
ε
ε−1 and y = (ε− 1)f we have τCHNH(y + f) = pHH(i)NHy;
– Market clearing (17) implies that pHH(i)NHy = NHpHH(i)cHH(i)+τNHpHH(i)cFH(i);
– From the pricing definitions and the optimal demand equations we have: NHpHH(i)cHH(i)+
τNHpHH(i)cFH(i) = PHHCHH + τPHHCFH
(iv) Finally, remember that PHFCHF + PHHCHH = PHCH .
Therefore, we can rewrite (57) as follows:
IH = [ZH + PHCH ] + τXHτPHHCFH − ττXFPFFCHF + (QZH − ZH) (58)
Totally differentiating this expression, we obtain:
dIH = dZH + PHdCH + CHdPH (59)
+ d(τXHPHH)τCFH + (ττXHPHH)dCFH
− d(τXFPFF )τCHF − (ττXFPFF )dCHF + dQZH − dZH
Note that:
• From (2) it follows that dCH =
(
CH
CHH
) 1
ε
dCHH +
(
CH
CHF
) 1
ε
dCHF . Using the optimal
demand equations (4) and (5) we have:
(
CH
CHH
) 1
ε
= PHH
PH
and
(
CH
CHF
) 1
ε
= PHF
PH
. Therefore,
PHdCH = PHHdCHH + PHFdCHF
• From (iii) we have τPHHCFH = NHpHH(i)y − PHHCHH . Therefore:
d(τXHPHH)τCFH + ττXHPHHdCFH =
yNHd(τXHpHH(i))− CHHd(τXHPHH) + τXHpHH(i)ydNH − τXHPHHdCHH
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Note also that from (8) and (9) we have −αdPH
PH
= −CH
IH
dPH . Therefore, indirect utility is given
by:
dVH = −CH
IH
dPH +
CH
IH
dPH +
yNHd(τXHpHH(i))− d(τXHPHH)CHH − d(τXFPFF )τCHF
IH
+
dQZH + τXHpHH(i)ydNH
IH
+
(1− τXH)PHHdCHH + (τIH − 1)ττXFPFFdCHF
IH
(60)
From (iii) and the fact that pHH(i) = PHHN
1
ε−1
H we have CHH = yN
ε
ε−1
H − τCFH . Using this
and observing that N
ε
ε−1
H d(τXHPHH) = NHd(τXHpHH(i)) +
1
1−εpHH(i)τXHdNH , we can write
(60) as:
dVH = −CH
IH
dPH +
CH
IH
dPH (61)
+
d(τXHPHH)τCFH − d(τXFPFF )τCHF
IH
+
dQZH + τXHpHH(i)ydNH +
τXHpHH(i)y
(ε−1) dNH
IH
+
(1− τXH)PHHdCHH + (τIH − 1)ττXFPFFdCHF
IH
Equation (28) follows immediately from this expression by observing that QZH = L−NHεf ,
y = (ε− 1)f and pHH(i) = τCH εε−1 . Thus, the production efficiency effect can be rewritten as:
dQZH + τXHpHH(i)y
ε
ε− 1dNH =
(
τXHτCH
ε
ε− 1 − 1
)
(y + f)dNH (62)
D Production Taxes
In this section we set τIH = τIF = τXH = τXF = 1 and we prove the propositions and the
lemmata of section 4.
Lemma A1: Policy Incentives for Production Subsidies. Assume ε−1
ε
≤ τCH = τCF ≤
1. Then, when there is a symmetric increase in the production subsidies in Home and Foreign,
production efficiency effects are positive. At the same time, when there is an unilateral increase
in the production subsidy in Home, the production efficiency effect is positive in the domestic
economy and negative in the foreign one, while domestic terms-of-trade effects are negative.
Formally,
(1) Let dτCH = dτCF < 0, then
(τCH
ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNH
IH
=
(τCF
ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNF
IF
> 0.
(2) Let dτCH < 0,
(τCH
ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNH
IH
> 0,
(τCF
ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNF
IF
< 0 and dPHHτCFH−dPFF τCHF
IH
<
0.
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Proof of Lemma A1.
(1) By imposing symmetry we obtain:
dNH = dNF =
∂NH
∂τCH
dτCH+
∂NH
∂τCF
dτCF =
(
∂NH
∂τCH
+
∂NF
∂τCH
)
dτCH =
(
∂NH
∂τCF
+
∂NF
∂τCF
)
dτCF
Then, (1) follows from the fact that if τCH = τCF = τC ≤ 1:
∂NH
∂τCH
+
∂NF
∂τCH
=
∂NH
∂τCF
+
∂NF
∂τCF
= − L(1− α)α
fε[α− (α− 1)τC ]2 < 0 (63)
which implies that dNH > 0 and dNF > 0 as long as dτCH < 0 and dτCF < 0.
(2) Observe that for ε−1
ε
≤ τCH = τCF ≤ 1, we have that (τCH εε−1 − 1)(y + f) > 0. Hence
the domestic (Foreign) production efficiency effect has the same sign as dNH (dNF ).
Moreover, once we impose symmetry, terms of trade effects in (31) can be written as:(
ε
ε−1N
− 1
ε−1
H dτCH − τCHε−1 εε−1N
− ε
ε−1
H dNH +
τCF
ε−1
ε
ε−1N
− ε
ε−1
F dNF
)
τCHF
IH
(64)
Thus, to prove (2) it suffices to show that as long as dτC < 0, dNH =
∂NH
∂τCH
dτCH > 0 and
dNF =
∂NF
∂τCH
dτCH < 0. This follows from the fact that if τCH = τCF = τC ≤ 1, then:
∂NH
∂τCH
=
Lα [τ 2 (α2 + (1− α2) τC) + τ ε+1 (2(1− α)(ε− 1)τC + α(2ε− 1)) + (1− α)τ 2ε ((1− α)τC + α)]
fε (τ ε − τ) [α− (α− 1)τC ]2 [α(τ + τ ε)(τC − 1)− τC(τ ε − τ)]
< 0
∂NF
∂τCH
=
Lατ [α(τ ε − τ) + τ ε (2(α− 1)ετC − 2αε)]
fε (τ ε − τ) [α− (α− 1)τC ]2 [α(τ + τ ε)(τC − 1)− τC(τ ε − τ)]
> 0
In fact, the denominator of both expressions is negative whenever τC ≤ 1. The numerator
of the first expression is always positive being the sum of only positive terms. For the
numerator of the second expression to be positive we would need τC <
α(1−τ1−ε−2ε)
2(1−α)ε , which
is not possible given that τC ≥ 0 by definition.
Proposition 2: Cooperative Production Subsidy. The optimal cooperative production
subsidy is set to exactly offset the price markup generated by monopolistic competition. This
subsidy implements a symmetric equilibrium with the first-best number of varieties. Formally,
(1) τCoopC =
ε−1
ε
and NCoop = NFB.
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Proof of Proposition 2. By setting τCoopC =
ε−1
ε
in both countries, the cooperative policy
maker exactly eliminates the price markup charged by the monopolistic firms in the differenti-
ated sector. Indeed, from equation (11) we see that individual domestic varieties are now priced
at their marginal costs i.e., pHH(i) = 1 and pFH(i) = τ and the same holds for the foreign coun-
try. Substituting τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
into equation (41), we obtain NH = NF =
αL
f(ε−1+α) ≡ NCoop.
This coincides with NFB of Proposition 1.
Lemma 1: Unilaterally Set Production Subsidies. The optimal unilateral deviation
entails a reduction in the production subsidy when starting from the efficient allocation. When
starting from the free trade allocation, the optimal unilateral deviation entails a production
subsidy. Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, ∂VH
∂τCH
> 0.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1,
∂VH
∂τCH
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then:
∂VH
∂τCH
=
αε2τ (τ ε + τ)
(ε− 1) (τ ε − τ) (α(τ + τ ε) + (ε− 1)(τ ε − τ)) > 0
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then
∂VH
∂τCH
= −α ((1− α)τ
ε + τ(α + ε− 1))
(ε− 1) (τ ε − τ) < 0 (65)
Proposition 3: Nash-Equilibrium Production Subsidies. In the Nash equilibrium both
countries set a production subsidy. However, this subsidy is smaller than the one needed to
implement the first-best allocation. The equilibrium number of varieties larger than in the free
trade allocation, but lower than the first-best level. Formally,
(1) τ coopC < τ
Nash
C < 1 and N
FT < NNash < NFB.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, we prove that τ coopC < τ
Nash
C < 1. The Nash solution of this
game will be symmetric due to the symmetry assumption for the two countries. Therefore, to
derive τNashC it is enough to compute the best reply of Home,
∂VH(PH(τCH ,τCF ),IH(τCH ,τCF ))
∂τCH
= 0,
and then impose symmetry, i.e., τCH = τCF = τC . Here, PH(τCH , τCF ) is given by equation (36),
which is implied by the equilibrium expressions for NH(τCH , τCF ) and NF (τCH , τCF ), equation
(41). Moreover, IH(τCH , τCF ) is given by L + (τCH − 1)εfNH(τCH , τCF ). When doing so, we
obtain a quadratic expression in τNashC :
a(τNashC )
2 + bτNashC + c = 0 (66)
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where a ≡ α(1−α)ετ ε[(3− 2ε−α)τ − (1−α)τ ε], b ≡ α[(ε− 1 +α)τ 2 + (1−α)(ε− 1−α(2ε−
1))τ 2ε + (2ε− 2 + α)(ε− 1− α(2ε− 1))τ 1+ε] and c ≡ α2(ε− 1)τ ε((2ε− 1 + α)τ + (1− α)τ ε).
Note that a < 0 and c > 0. To prove that a < 0 it suffices to see that:
(i) τ ε > τ ∀ε > 1 and ∀τ > 1;
(ii) 1− α > 3− 2ε− α ∀ε > 1.
Hence, (66) has two real solutions, one positive and one negative ∀ε > 1, α ∈ (0, 1) and τ > 1.
Then, since τNashC ∈ [0,∞), (66) implies that the Nash solution always exists and is unique. As
a consequence:
(i) At τC = 1 we have: aτ
2
C + bτC + c = −α(τ ε − τ)[(ε+ α− 1)τ + (1− α)τ ε] < 0, implying
that τNashC < 1 since a < 0.
(ii) At τFBC =
ε−1
ε
we have: aτ 2C + bτC + c =
α(ε−1)(ε+α−1)τ(τ+τε)
ε
> 0, implying τFBC < τ
Nash
C .
Second, we show that NFT < NNash < NFB. This follows from τCoopC < τ
Nash
C < 1 and
dNH > 0 since
∂NH
∂τCH
+ ∂NF
∂τCH
< 0 ∀τCH such that ε−1ε ≤ τCH = τCF ≤ 1 (see the proof of point
(1) of Lemma A1 and condition (63)).
E Import Taxes
In this section, while retaining the assumption τXH = τXF = 1, we prove the propositions and
the lemmata of section 5 where we allow for the use of an import tariff as the policy instrument.
Lemma A2: Policy Incentives for Import Subsidies/Tariffs. If τCH = τCF = 1, then
when there is a symmetric increase in the import subsidies in Home and in Foreign, production
efficiency effects are positive and consumption wedges are negative. At the same time, if τCH =
τCF = 1 and τIH = τIF = 1 when there is a unilateral increase in the import tariff at Home,
the production efficiency effect is positive in the domestic economy and negative in the foreign
one, while domestic terms-of-trade effects are negative. Instead, if τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
and
τIH = τIF = 1, a unilateral increase in the import subsidy at Home generates positive domestic
terms-of-trade effects. Formally,
(1) Let τCH = τCF = 1, τIH = τIF ≤ 1 and dτIH = dτIF < 0, then (
ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNH
IH
=
( ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNF
IF
> 0, (τIH−1)τPFF dCHF
IH
< 0 and (τIF−1)τPHHdCFH
IF
< 0.
(2) Let τCH = τCF = 1, τIH = τIF = 1 and dτIH > 0, then
( ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNH
IH
> 0,
( ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNF
IF
<
0 and dPHHτCFH−dPFF τCHF
IH
< 0.
(3) Let τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, τIH = τIF = 1 and dτIH < 0, then
dPHHτCFH−dPFF τCHF
IH
< 0.
Proof of Lemma A2.
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(1) By imposing symmetry we obtain:
dNH = dNF =
∂NH
∂τIH
dτIH +
∂NH
∂τIF
dτIF =
(
∂NH
∂τIH
+
∂NF
∂τIH
)
dτIH =
(
∂NH
∂τIF
+
∂NF
∂τIF
)
dτIF
dCHF = dCFH =
∂CHF
∂τIH
dτIH+
∂CHF
∂τIF
dτIF =
(
∂CHF
∂τIH
+
∂CFH
∂τIH
)
dτIH =
(
∂CHF
∂τIF
+
∂CFH
∂τIF
)
dτIF
Then, production efficiency effects are positive since if τIH = τIF = τI ≤ 1 and τCH =
τCF = 1:
∂NH
∂τIH
+
∂NF
∂τIH
=
∂NH
∂τIF
+
∂NF
∂τIF
= −L(1− α)ατ ((ε(1− τI) + τI) τ
ετ εI + ττI)
fετI (τIτ(1− α) + τ ετ εI + ατ)2
< 0 (67)
At the same time, consumption wedges are negative since if τIH = τIF = τI ≤ 1 and
τCH = τCF = 1:
∂CHF
∂τIH
+
∂CFH
∂τIH
=
∂CHF
∂τIF
+
∂CFH
∂τIF
= −
fε ((1− α)τ 2τI + τ ετ εI ((ε− α)τ + (ε− 1)τ ετ εI ))
(
PHH
ττI
ε−1
ε
)−ε
τI (τ ετ εI + τ)
2 (ατ + (1− α)ττI + τ ετ εI )
< 0
which imply that dCH > 0 and dCF > 0 as long as dτCH < 0 and dτCF < 0.
(2) First, note that domestic (Foreign) production efficiency effects have the same sign as
dNH (dNF ), given that (
ε
ε−1 − 1)(y+ f) > 0. Moreover, once we impose symmetry, terms
of trade effects in (33) can be written as:(
− 1
ε−1
ε
ε−1N
− ε
ε−1
H dNH +
1
ε−1
ε
ε−1N
− ε
ε−1
F dNF
)
τCHF
IH
Thus, to prove (2) it suffices to show that if τIH = τIF = 1 and τCH = τCF = 1, then
dNH =
∂NH
∂τIH
dτIH > 0 and dNF =
∂NF
∂τIH
< 0 as long as dτIH > 0. Indeed, in this case:
∂NH
∂τIH
=
Lατ ε+1 [(1 + ε− α)τ + (α + ε− 1)τ ε]
fε(τ − τ ε)2(τ + τ ε) > 0
∂NF
∂τIH
= −Lατ [(1− α)τ
2 + ετ 2ε + (α + ε− 1)τ ε+1]
fε(τ − τ ε)2(τ + τ ε) < 0
which means that domestic production efficiency effects are positive, Foreign ones are
negative and domestic terms-of-trade effects are negative, since dNH =
∂NH
∂τIH
dτIH > 0 and
dNF =
∂NF
∂τIH
dτIH < 0 if dτIH > 0.
(3) Similarly to point (2), to prove (3) we need to show that if τIH = τIF = 1 and τCH =
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τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then:
∂NH
∂τIH
=
Lατ(ε− 1) [(1− α)ατ 2 + (α + ε− 1)2τ 2ε + (ε2 + α− 1)τ 1+ε]
f(α + ε− 1)2 [α(τ + τ ε) + (ε− 1)(τ ε − τ)] (τ 2ε − τ 2) > 0
∂NF
∂τIH
= −Lατ(ε− 1) [(ε− 1)(1− α)τ
2 + ε(α + ε− 1)τ 2ε + ((ε− 1)2 + α(2ε− 1))τ ε+1]
f(α + ε− 1)2 [α(τ + τ ε) + (ε− 1)(τ ε − τ)] (τ 2ε − τ 2) < 0
Proposition 4: Cooperative Import Subsidy. If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, the cooperative
policy maker refrains from using taxes on imports and the number of varieties equals the first-
best level. If τCH = τCF = 1, the cooperative policy maker finds it optimal to subsidize imports.
The number of varieties is larger than in the free trade allocation, but remains lower than the
first-best level. Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then τCoopI = 1 and N
Coop = NFB.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then
ε−1
ε
< τCoopI < 1 and N
FT < NCoop < NFB.
Proof of Proposition 4. In the case of tariffs, the cooperative policy maker maximizes:
max
τIH ,τIF
VH(PH(τIH , τIF ), IH(τIH , τIF )) + VF (PF (τIH , τIF ), IF (τIH , τIF )) (68)
where PH(τIH , τIF ) is given by equation (36) once we substitute inNH(τIH , τIF ) andNH(τIH , τIF )
as implicitly determined by equation (22). IH(τIH , τIF ) is equal to L+(τCH−1)NH(τIH , τIF )εf+
(τIH−1)τPFF (τIH , τIF )CHF (τIH , τIF ) where PFF (τIH , τIF ) = εε−1τCFNF (τIH , τIF )
1
1−ε , CHF (τIH , τIF )
= PHF (τIH , τIF )
−εPH(τIH , τIF )εCH(τIH , τIF ), PHF (τIH , τIF ) = εε−1ττIHτCFNF (τIH , τIF )
1
1−ε and
finally CH(τIH , τIF ) is given by its equilibrium value in equation (37). Symmetric conditions
apply to foreign variables.
(1) To prove the first part of the proposition it suffices to show that if τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, the
cooperative policy maker finds it optimal to set τIH = τIF = 1.
By differentiating (68) with respect to τIH and imposing symmetry, i.e. τIH = τIF = τI ,
the first-order condition can be written as:
− αετ (τI − 1) ((α + ε− 1)τ
2ετ 2εI + (1− α)τ 2τI + ετ ε+1τ εI )
τI (τ ετ εI + τ) (τ
ετ εI + ττI) ((α + ε− 1)τ ετ εI + (1− α)(ε− 1)ττI + αετ)
= 0
Then, it is easy to verify that this condition is satisfied iff τI = 1.
(2) To prove the second part of the proposition we follow three steps: (i) first, we show
that if τCH = τCF = 1, no cooperative solution exists for τI > 1; (ii) second, we show
that if τCH = τCF = 1, there exists a solution for τI < 1; (iii) third, we prove that if
τCH = τCF = 1 τ
Coop
I < 1 and N
FT < NCoopI < N
FB. If τCH = τCF = 1, then by
taking the derivative of (68) with respect to τIH and imposing symmetry, the first-order
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condition can be written as:
ACoopI (τI)
BCoopI (τI)
= 0
where:
ACoopI (τI) ≡ ατ(τ ε+1τ εI
(
τI
(
2α− ε2 + ε− 2)+ (ε− 1)ε)
+ τ 2ετ 2εI (ε(α + ε− 2)− (ε− 1)τI(α + ε− 1)) + (α− 1)τ 2τI (ετI − ε+ 1))
BCoopI (τI) ≡ (ε− 1)τI (τ ετ εI + τ) (τ ετ εI + ττI) (τI(τ − ατ) + τ ετ εI + ατ)
(i) At the optimum, it must be that ACoopI (τI) = A
Coop
I (τ
Coop
I ) = 0. To prove that no
cooperative solution exists for τI > 1 it suffices to notice that all terms in A
Coop
I (τI)
are strictly negative for τI > 1 and thus A
Coop
I (τI) has no zeros for τI > 1.
(ii) In order to prove that a cooperative solution exists for τI < 1, consider that: (a)
ACoopI (τI) is a continuous function in τI ; (b) A
Coop
I (1) = −(1−α)ατ (τ ε + τ)2 < 0; (c)
ACoopI (0) = 0 and ∂A
Coop
I (0)/∂τI = (1−α)α(ε−1)τ 3 > 0. Then, by the intermediate
value theorem there exists a value τI ∈ (0, 1) such that ACoopI (τI) = 0.
(iii) Finally, we need to prove that if τCH = τCF = 1, it holds that τ
Coop
I < 1, N
FT <
NCoop < NFB. We do this in several steps.
(a) If 0 < τI < 1, by symmetrically increasing the subsidy on imports in both
countries the cooperative policy maker increases the total number of varieties.
Indeed, by (67) at the symmetric equilibrium dNH = dNF > 0 since
∂NH
∂τIH
+
∂NH
∂τIF
) < 0 dτIH = dτIF < 0. Thus, dNH > 0 together with point (ii) – proving
that the cooperative solution entails τI < 1 – imply thatN
FT < NCoop. Then, we
are left with the comparison between the cooperative solution and the first-best.
After imposing τCH = τCF = τXH = τXF = 1 and τIH = τIF in (41), we compute
the number of varieties produced in each country in the symmetric equilibrium:
NH(τI) =
Lα(τ+(ττI)
ε)
fε(ατ+τ(1−α)τI+(ττI)ε) and we observe that limτI→0NH(τI) =
L
fε
where
L
fε
> Lα
f(ε+α−1) = N
FB since ε > 1 and 0 < α < 1. As a consequence, there
exists a τI small enough so that the cooperative policy maker can implement
the first-best number of varieties. The question is whether he wants to do so.
(b) Let τCoopI = f(α, ε, τ) and τ
FB
I = g(α, ε, τ) be, respectively, the solution to the
cooperative problem and the subsidy implementing the first-best level of number
of varieties. Thus, τCoopI is such that A
Coop
I (τ
Coop
I ) = 0, while τ
FB
I is such that
N(τFBI ) =
Lα(τ+(ττFBI )
ε)
fε(ατ+τ(1−α)τFBI +(ττFBI )ε)
= Lα
f(ε+α−1) = N
FB. Though it is not possible
to find an explicit solution for τFBI , the condition NH(τ
FB
I ) = N
FB simplifies to
(ττFBI )
ε = −εττFBI + τ(ε−1). If we substitute this condition into ACoopI (τI) = 0
we obtain a cubic expression in τI . The solutions are τI = { ε−1ε , 1, 1}. However,
none of these solves (ττI)
ε = −εττI + τ(ε− 1). More precisely, they all imply a
level of subsidy on imports smaller than what needed to implement the first-best
level of varieties. Thus, we conclude that there is no intersection between the
set of τCoopI and the set of τ
FB
I .
(c) The last step is to prove that τFBI < τ
Coop
I always. From (67) it will then follow
that NCoopI < NFB. To this purpose, note that f and g are two continuous
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functions in the space {0 < α < 1, τ > 1, ε > 1}. This is so since, by the
implicit function theorem, we can compute the derivatives of τFBI and τ
Coop
I
with respect to the three parameters and the derivative always exists in such
parametric space. In point (b) we proved that there is no intersection between
g and f . It must then be that one always lies on top of the other, i.e., it either
always holds that τFBI < τ
Coop
I or the other way around. We evaluate both
functions at {α = 0.5, ε = 2, τ = 1.5} and find τFBI = 0.39 < 0.63 = τCoopI .28
Thus, the cooperative import subsidy is always smaller than the one needed to
implement the first-best number of varieties.
Lemma 2: Unilaterally Set Import Tariffs/Subsidies. Let τIH = τIF = 1. The opti-
mal unilateral deviation entails an import subsidy when starting from the first-best allocation
implemented by a production subsidy, and an import tariff when starting from the free trade
allocation. Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then ∂VH
∂τIH
< 0.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then
∂VH
∂τIH
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.
(1) If τIH = τIF = 1 and τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, it is easy to show that:
∂VH
∂τIH
= − ατ
2 ((α + 2ε− 1)τ ε + (1− α)τ)
((α(τ ε + τ) + (ε− 1)(τ ε − τ)) (τ 2ε − τ 2) < 0.
(2) If τIH = τIF = 1 and τCH = τCF = 1, it is easy to show that:
∂VH
∂τIH
=
ατ ((α + ε− 1)τ ε + (1− α)τ)
(ε− 1) (τ 2ε − τ 2) > 0.
Proposition 5: Nash-Equilibrium Import Tariffs/Subsidies. When starting from the
first-best allocation, the Nash-equilibrium policy consists of an import subsidy, implying more
varieties than the first-best allocation. In contrast, when starting from the free trade alloca-
tion, the Nash-equilibrium entails a tariff, implying less varieties than the free trade allocation.
Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then τNashI < 1 and N
FT < NFB < NNash.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then there exists a τ
Nash
I > 1 such that N
Nash < NFT < NFB.
28The other solutions are either negative or zero, thus we exclude them since τI > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 5. In the case of tariffs, the non-cooperative policy maker maximizes:
max
τIH
VH(PH(τIH , τIF ), IH(τIH , τIF )) (69)
where PH(τIH , τIF ) is given by equation (36) once we substitute inNH(τIH , τIF ) andNF (τIH , τIF )
as implicitly determined by equation (22). IH(τIH , τIF ) is equal to L+(τCH−1)NH(τIH , τIF )εf+
(τIH−1)τPFF (τIH , τIF )CHF (τIH , τIF ) where PFF (τIH , τIF ) = εε−1τCF (NF (τIH , τIF ))
1
1−ε , CHF (τIH , τIF )
= PHF (τIH , τIF )
−εPH(τIH , τIF )εCH(τIH , τIF ), PHF (τIH , τIF ) = εε−1ττIHτCF (NF (τIH , τIF ))
1
1−ε
and finally CH(τIH , τIF ) is given by its equilibrium value in equation (37).
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
and τIH = τIF , the first-order condition of (69) with respect to τIH
can be written as:
ANashI (τI)
BNashI (τI)
= 0
where
ANashI (τI) ≡ α(ε− 2)ε2τ ε+3τ εI + (α− 1)ε
(
α + ε2 − 1) τ ε+3τ ε+2I
+ (α− 1) (ε2 + ε− 1) (α + ε− 1)τ 2ε+2τ 2ε+2I
− (α + ε− 1) (αε+ α + ε2 + ε− 1) τ 3ε+1τ 3ε+1I
+
(
(1− 2α)ε3 + 2(α− 1)ε2 − (α− 1)αε+ (α− 1)2) τ ε+3τ ε+1I
+ ε(α(ε− 1)− 1)(α + ε− 1)τ 2ε+2τ 2εI
+ ε(α + ε− 1)2τ 3ε+1τ 3εI − ε(α + ε− 1)((2α− 1)ε+ 2)τ 2ε+2τ 2ε+1I
+ ε(α + ε− 1)2τ 4ετ 4εI − ε(α + ε− 1)2τ 4ετ 4ε+1I − (α− 1)2(ε− 1)ετ 4τ 3I
+ (α− 1)(ε− 1)τ 4τ 2I (α(2ε− 1)− ε+ 1) + (1− α)α(ε− 2)ετ 4τI
BNashI (τI) ≡ τI (τ ετ εI + ττI)
(
τ 2ετ 2εI − τ 2
)
((α + ε− 1)τ ετ εI + (α− 1)(ε− 1)ττI − α(ε− 2)τ)
((α + ε− 1)τ ετ εI + ττI(−αε+ α + ε− 1) + αετ)
The first part of Proposition 5 is proved by showing that if τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
: (i) there
is no solution of the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative policy game for τI > 1;
(ii) if ε > 2, there exists a solution of the non-cooperative policy game for τI < 1; (iii)
NNash > NFB > NFT .
(i) In order to show that no Nash equilibrium exists, we need to prove that there are
no zeros of ANashI (τI) for τI > 1. This is so because: (a) A
Nash
I is a second-order
polynomial in α; (b) if α = 0 or α = 1, ANashI (τI) < 0; (c)
∂ANashI (τI)
∂τI
|α=0 < 0.
(a) It is straightforward to see that ANashI is quadratic in α.
(b) If α = 0 and τI > 1
ANashI (τI) = −(ε− 1)(τ ε+3τ ε+1I ((ε+ 1)ετI − ε(ε− 1) + 1)
+ τ 2ε+2τ 2εI
((
ε2 + ε− 1) τ 2I − (ε− 2)ετI + ε)
+ τ 3ε+1τ 3εI
((
ε2 + ε− 1) τI − (ε− 1)ε)
+ τ 4ετ 4εI (ε− 1)ε (τI − 1)
+ τ 4τ 2I (ε (τI − 1) + 1)) < 0
44
If α = 1 and τI > 1
ANashI (τI) = −ε2τ ετ εI (τ ετ εI + τ)
(
2τ ε+1τ ε+1I + ε (τI − 1) τ 2ετ 2εI + τ 2 (ετI − ε+ 2)
)
< 0
(c) To see why ∂ANashI (τI)/∂τI < 0, first consider that if α = 0:
∂ANashI (τI)
∂τI
= τ 4εI τ
4εκ1 + τ
3ε+1τ 3εI κ2 + τ
2ε+2τ 2εI κ3 + τ
ε+3τ εI κ4 + τ
4τIκ5
where:
κ1 ≡ −2(ε− 1)ε (τI − 1)
κ2 ≡ −
((
2ε2 + ε− 2) τI − 2(ε− 1)ε)
κ3 ≡ (ε− 2)
(
ε2 + ε− 1) τ 2I + ((3− 2ε)ε− 2)ετI + (ε− 2)ε2
κ4 ≡ τI
[(
ε2 − 2) ετI − 2(ε− 1)ε2 + ε− 2]+ (ε− 2)ε2
κ5 ≡ (ε− 1)τI (2ετI − 3ε+ 2) + (ε− 2)ε
First, we show that ∂ANashI (τI)/∂τI < 0 for ε < 2. Under this assumption
κ1 < 0, κ2 < 0, κ3 < 0 and κ3 − κ4 < 0. In this case it is sufficient to show that
τ 4εI τ
4εκ1 + τ
3ε+1τ 3εI κ2 + τ
4τIκ5 < 0. Note that τ
4ε
I τ
4εκ1 + τ
3ε+1τ 3εI κ2 + τ
4τIκ5 <
δ(τI) where δ(τI) ≡ (κ1 +κ2)τ 2εI +κ5. It can be shown that δ′(τI) < 0. It follows
then from δ(τI) = −2ε at τI = 1 that δ(τI) < 0.
Second, we show that ∂ANashI (τI)/∂τI < 0 for ε > 2. Under this assumption
κ1 < 0, κ2 < 0 and κ5 < 0 . Therefore, in this case it suffices to show that
τ 4εI τ
4εκ1+τ
2ε+2τ 2εI κ3 < 0 and τ
3ε+1τ 3εI κ2+τ
ε+3τ εI κ4+τ
4τIκ5 < 0 or alternatively
that δ1(τI) ≡ κ1τ 2εI + κ3 < 0 and δ2(τI) ≡ κ2τ 2εI + κ4 + κ5 < 0. These last
conditions are always satisfied because at τI = 1, δ1(τI) = 2 − 5ε and δ2(τI) =
−2− 3ε and it can be proved that δ′2(τI) < 0 and δ′1(τI) < 0 .
(ii) This is equivalent to show that there is at least one zero of ANashI (τI) for τI <
1. A sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash solution is ε > 2. To see
why this is the case, consider that: a) ANashI (τI) is a continuous function in τI ; b)
ANashI (1) = −τ(α+ε−1) (τ ε + τ)2 ((1− α)τ + (α + 2ε− 1)τ ε) < 0; c) ANashI (0) = 0
and ∂ANashI (0)/∂τI = (1 − α)α(ε − 2)ετ 4 > 0 for ε > 2. Then, by the intermediate
value theorem there exists a value τI ∈ (0, 1) such that ANashI (τI) = 0.
(iii) To prove this statement recall that if τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then
∂NH
∂τIH
+
∂NH
∂τIF
= − L(1− α)α(ε− 1)τ (τ
ε (ε(1− τI) + τI) τ εI + ττI)
fτI ((α + ε− 1)τ ετ εI + ττI(1− α)(ε− 1) + αετ) 2
< 0
for all τI ≤ 1. We have already proven at point (i) and (ii) that when τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, τNashI < 1. As a consequence, N
Nash > NFB > NFT since at the symmetric
equilibrium dNH =
∂NH
∂τIH
dτIH +
∂NH
∂τIF
dτIF = (
∂NH
∂τIH
+ ∂NH
∂τIF
)dτIH > 0 for all τI ≤ 1 and
dτIH = dτIF < 0.
(2) By taking the derivative of (69) with respect to τIH and imposing symmetry i.e., τIH =
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τIF = τI , the first-order condition evaluated at τCH = τCF = 1 can be written as:
ANashI (τI)
BNashI (τI)
= 0
where
ANashI (τI) ≡ α(τ 2ε+3τ 2εI (τI
(
(α− 1)(ε+ 1)τI(α + ε− 1)− α2(2ε+ 1)− 2α(ε− 1)ε+ (ε− 1)ε+ 1
)
+ αε(α + ε− 1)) + ετ ε+4 ((α− 1)τI − α) (ετI − ε+ 1) τ εI
− ετ 3ε+2τ 3εI (τI(α + ε− 1)− α− ε)
+ (−α− ε+ 1)τ 4ε+1 ((ε− 1)τI − ε) τ 4εI − (α− 1)τ 5τI ((α− 1)τI − α) (ετI − ε+ 1))
BNashI (τI) ≡ (ε− 1)τI (τ ετ εI + ττI)
(
τ 2ετ 2εI − τ 2
)
((α− 1)ττI + τ ετ εI − ατ) (τI(τ − ατ) + τ ετ εI + ατ)
To prove the second part of Proposition 5 we need to show that: (i) there exist at least
one Nash equilibrium of the policy game for which τNashI > 1; (ii) for such a τ
Nash
I > 1,
we have NNash < NFT < NFB
(i) To show this point consider that:
(a) ANashI (τI) is a continuous function of τI ;
(b) If τI = 1 A
Nash
I = τ (τ
ε − τ) (τ ε + τ)2 [(α + ε− 1)τ ε − ατ + τ ] > 0;
(c) If τI =
ε
ε−1 :
ANashI
(
ε
ε− 1
)
=
− ετ
2
(ε− 1)3
[
(ε− 1)τ (α(ε− α) + α(1− α) + (ε− 1)(2ε− 1))
(
ετ
ε− 1
)2ε
+ (1− α)(2ε− 1)τ 3(ε− α) + (2ε− 1)(ε− 1)τ 2(ε− α)
(
ετ
ε− 1
)ε
+ α(ε− 1)2−3ε(ετ)3ε] < 0,
Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem there exists a τNashI ∈ {1, εε−1} such
that ANashI (τ
Nash
I ) = 0.
(ii) To prove this statement recall that by (67), if τI <
ε
ε−1 , then at the symmetric
equilibrium (i.e., τIH = τIF = τI)
∂NH
∂τIH
dτIH +
∂NH
∂τIF
dτIF < 0. Hence, from (i) and
(67) we can be sure that there exists a solution τNashI ∈ {1, εε−1} such that NNash <
NFT < NFB.
F Export Taxes
In this section while retaining the assumption τIH = τIF = 1, we prove the propositions and
the lemmata of section 6, where we allow for the use of export taxes/subsidies as the policy
instrument.
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Lemma A3: Policy Incentives for Export Subsidies/Taxes If τCH = τCF = 1, then
when there is a symmetric increase in the export subsidies in Home and in Foreign, production
efficiency effects are positive. At the same time, if τXH = τXF = τCH = τCF = 1, when there
is a unilateral increase in export subsidies at Home, the production efficiency effect is positive
in the domestic economy and negative in the foreign one, while domestic terms-of-trade effects
are negative. If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
and τXH = τXF = 1, a unilateral increase in the export tax
at Home generates positive terms-of-trade effects. Formally,
(1) Let τCH = τCF = 1 and τXH = τXF ≤ 1. If dτXH = dτXF < 0, then (
ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNH
IH
=
( ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNF
IF
> 0.
(2) Let τXH = τXF = τCH = τCF = 1. If dτXH < 0, then
( ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNH
IH
> 0,
( ε
ε−1−1)(y+f)dNF
IF
<
0 and d(τXHPHH)τCFH−d(τXFPFF )τCHF
IH
< 0.
(3) Let τXH = τXF = 1 and τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
. If dτXH > 0, then
d(τXHPHH)τCFH−d(τXFPFF )τCHF
IH
>
0.
Proof of Lemma A3.
(1) Let τCH = τCF = 1. By imposing symmetry, we obtain:
dNH = dNF =
∂NH
∂τXH
dτXH +
∂NH
∂τXF
dτXF =
(
∂NH
∂τXH
+
∂NF
∂τXH
)
dτXH
When 0 < τXH = τXF ≤ 1 the following derivative is negative:
∂NH
∂τXH
+
∂NF
∂τXH
= −L(1− α)ατ(τXτ + (τXτ)
ε(τX + ε(1− τX)))
fτXε(ατ + (τXτ)ε + τXτ(1− α))2 < 0
which implies that dNH = dNF > 0 ⇐⇒ dτHX = dτXF < 0 i.e., symmetric production
subsidies generate positive production efficiency effects for both Home and Foreign.
(2) Let τXH = τXF = τCH = τCF = 1. The change in the number of Home and Foreign
varieties when τXH moves unilaterally is given by:
dNH =
∂NH
∂τXH
dτXH = −Lατ(τ
2 + (ε− α)τ 2ε + (ε− 1 + α)τ 1+ε
fε(τ − τ ε)2(τ + τ ε) dτXH
dNF =
∂NF
∂τXH
dτXH =
Lατ(ατ 2 + (ε− 1)τ 2ε + (ε− 1 + α)τ 1+ε
fε(τ − τ ε)2(τ + τ ε) dτXH
Therefore, dNH > 0 and dNF < 0 ⇐⇒ dτXH < 0. Thus, unilateral increase in the export
subsidy generates production efficiency effects that are positive for Home and negative
for Foreign.
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Once we impose symmetry and we assume that τXH = τXF = 1, terms-of-trade effects in
(35) can be written as:(
ε
ε−1N
− 1
ε−1
H dτXH − τCHε−1 εε−1N
− ε
ε−1
H dNH +
τCF
ε−1
ε
ε−1N
− ε
ε−1
F dNF
)
τCHF
IH
(70)
We just showed that dτXH < 0 implies dNH > 0 and dNF < 0, i.e., unilaterally set
export subsidies generate negative consumption based terms-of-trade effects both directly,
through their impact on the price of exported varieties, and indirectly, through their
impact on the number of Home and Foreign varieties.
(3) It remains to show is that when τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
and dτXH > 0 then dNH < 0 and
dNF > 0. This follows from the fact that:
∂NH
∂τXH
= −Lα(ε− 1)τ (τ
2 (α2 + ε− 1) + (α(2ε− 1) + (ε− 1)2) τ ε+1 + (ε− α)(α + ε− 1)τ 2ε)
f(α + ε− 1)2 (τ 2ε − τ 2) (α(τ ε + τ) + (ε− 1)(τ ε − τ)) < 0
∂NF
∂τXH
=
Lα(ε− 1)τ ((α + ε2 − 1) τ ε+1 + (ε− 1)(α + ε− 1)τ 2ε + αετ 2)
f(α + ε− 1)2 (τ 2ε − τ 2) (α(τ ε + τ) + (ε− 1)(τ ε − τ)) > 0
Proposition 6: Cooperative Export Subsidy. If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, the cooperative policy
maker refrains from using taxes on exports and the number of varieties equals the first-best
level. If τCH = τCF = 1, the cooperative policy maker finds it optimal to subsidize exports.
The number of varieties is larger than in the free trade allocation, but remains lower than the
first-best level. Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then τCoopX = 1 and N
Coop = NFB.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then τ
Coop
X < 1 and N
FT < NCoop < NFB.
Proof of Proposition 6.
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, the cooperative policy maker solves:
max
τXH ,τXF
VH(PH(τXH , τXF ), IH(τXH , τXF )) + VF (PF (τXH , τXF ), IF (τXH , τXF )) (71)
Here, PH(τXH , τXF ) is given by equation (36), which is implied by the equilibrium ex-
pressions for NH(τXH , τXF ) and NF (τXH , τXF ), equation (41). IH(τXH , τXF ), is given
by LH + (τXH − 1)τPHH(τXH , τXF )CFH(τXH , τXF ) + (τCH − 1)NH(τXH , τXF )εf where
PHH(τXH , τXF ) =
ε
ε−1τCHNH(τXH , τXF )
1
1−ε , CFH(τXH , τXF ) = PFH(τXH , τXF )
−εPF (τXH , τXF )ε
CF (τXH , τXF ) and PFH(τXH , τXF ) =
ε
ε−1ττXHτCHNH(τXH , τXF )
1
1−ε . Finally, CH(τXH , τXF )
is given by its equilibrium value in equation (37). Symmetric conditions apply to foreign
variables.
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Taking derivatives with respect to τXH and τXF and imposing symmetry, the first-order
condition can be written as:
αετ(τX − 1)[(α + ε− 1)τ 2ετ 2εX + (1− α)τ 2τX + ετ ε+1τ εX ]
τX(τ ετ εX + τ)(τ
ετ εX + ττX)[−(α + ε− 1)τ ετ εX + (α− 1)(ε− 1)ττX − αετ ]
= 0
It is straightforward to see that τX = 1 is the unique solution to this equation. We have
already shown in Proposition 2 that τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, τXH = τXF = 1 implements the
first-best allocation. Thus, NCoop = NFB.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, the cooperative policy maker solves the same problem as in (1) but
income is now given by IH(τXH , τXF ) = L+(τXH−1)τPHHCFH and similarly for Foreign.
Taking derivatives with respect to τXH and τXF and imposing symmetry, the first-order
condition can now be written as
ACoopX (τX)
BCoopX (τX)
= 0,
where
ACoopX (τX) ≡ ατ [τ ε+1τ εX [τX(2α− ε2 + ε− 2) + (ε− 1)ε]
+ τ 2ετ 2εX [ε(α + ε− 2)− (ε− 1)τX(α + ε− 1)] + (α− 1)τ 2τX(ετX − ε+ 1)]
BCoopX (τX) ≡ (ε− 1)τX(τ ετ εX + τ)(τ ετ εX + ττX)(τX(τ − ατ) + τ ετ εX + ατ)
Note that ACoopX (τX) = A
Coop
I (τI) and B
Coop
X (τX) = B
Coop
I (τI) with the only difference that
they are functions of τX instead of τI . Thus, the proof is the same as the one for the
cooperative import subsidy (Proposition 4).
Lemma 3: Unilaterally Set Export Taxes/Subsidies. Let τXH = τXF = 1. The optimal
unilateral deviation entails an export tax when starting from the first-best allocation implemented
by a production subsidy, and an export subsidy when starting from the free trade allocation.
Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then ∂VH
∂τXH
> 0.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then
∂VH
∂τXH
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 3:
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then:
∂VH
∂τX
=
ατ ((1− α)τ ε+1 + (α + ε− 1)τ 2ε + ετ 2)
(τ 2ε − τ 2) (α(τ ε + τ) + (ε− 1)(τ ε − τ)) > 0
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(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then:
∂VH
∂τXH
= −ατ (τ(α + ε− 1) + (1− α)τ
ε)
(ε− 1) (τ 2ε − τ 2) < 0
Proposition 7: Nash-Equilibrium Export Taxes/Subsidies. When starting from the
first-best allocation, the Nash-equilibrium policy consists of an export tax, implying less varieties
than the first-best allocation. In contrast, when starting from the free trade allocation, the Nash-
equilibrium entails an export subsidy, implying more varieties than the free trade allocation.
Formally,
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, then τNashX > 1 and N
Nash < NFB.
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, then τ
Nash
X < 1 and N
FT < NNash < NFB.
Proof of Proposition 7.
(1) If τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
, the Nash policy maker solves:
max
τXH
VH(PH(τXH , τXF ), IH(τXH , τXF )) (72)
Here, PH(τXH , τXF ) is given by equation (36), which is implied by the equilibrium expres-
sions for NH(τXH , τXF ) and NF (τXH , τXH), equation (41). Moreover, I(τXH , τXF ) = L+
(τXH−1)τPHH(τXH , τXF )CFH(τXH , τXF )+(τCH−1)NH(τXH , τXF )εf , where PHH(τXH , τXF )
= ε
ε−1τCHNH(τXH , τXF )
1
1−ε , CFH = PFH(τXH , τXF )
−εPF (τXH , τXF )εCF (τXH , τXF ), PFH(τXH , τXF )
= ε
ε−1ττXHτCHNH(τXH , τXF )
1
1−ε and finally CF (τXH , τXF ) is given by its equilibrium value
in equation (37).
Taking derivatives with respect to τXH and τXF and then imposing symmetry i.e., τXH =
τXF = τX , the first-order conditions at the symmetric Nash equilibrium can be written as
ANashX (τX)
BNashX (τX)
= 0 (73)
where
ANashX (τX) ≡ ατ{−τ ε+3τ ε+1X [τX((α2 − 1)(ε− 1)ετX + (−2α2 + α− 2)ε2 + (α− 1)2 + ε3)
+ ε((α− 1)αε+ (α− 1)α− ε2 + ε)]
+ τ 2ε+2τ 2εX [τX(ετX(α
2 + α(ε− 1)2 − (ε− 2)(ε− 1))
− α2(ε+ 1) + 2α(−ε3 + ε2 + 1) + (ε− 1)(ε2 + 1)) + αε3]
+ τ 3ε+1τ 3εX (α + ε− 1)[(ε− 1)τX (τX(α(ε− 1) + 1)− (2α + 1)ε) + (α + 1)ε2]
− τ 4εX τ 4ε(α + ε− 1)2[(ε− 1)τX − ε] + τ 4τ 2Xε(α + ε− 1)}
50
BNashX (τX) ≡ τX(τ ετ εX + ττX)(τ 2ετ 2εX − τ 2)[(α + ε− 1)τ ετ εX − (α + 1)(ε− 1)ττX + αετ ]
[(α + ε− 1)τ ετ εX + ττX(−αε+ α + ε− 1) + αετ ]
(i) We first show that no solution with τX < 1 exists. Focusing on the numerator of the
first-order condition, this is so since all terms of ANashX (τX) are positive for τX < 1.
(ii) Next, we show that there exists at least one solution with τX > 1.
(a) For τX = 1, A
Nash
X (1) = (ε+α−1) (τ ε + τ)2 [(1−α)τ ετ+ετ 2+τ 2ε(ε−1+α)] > 0;
(b) limτX→∞A
Nash
X (τX) = −∞;
(c) Thus, by continuity ofANashX (τX), there exists a τ
Nash
X > 1 such thatA
Nash
X (τ
Nash
X ) =
0.
(iii) It remains to show that if τNashX > 1, then N
Nash < NFB. When τCH = τCF =
ε−1
ε
and after imposing symmetry i.e., τXH = τXF = τX and dτXH = dτXF :
dNH =
∂NH
∂τXH
dτXH +
∂NH
∂τXF
dτXF =
(
∂NH
∂τXH
+
∂NH
∂τXF
)
dτXH
=
L(1− α)α(ε− 1)τ [τ ετ εX ((ε− 1)τX − ε)− ττX ]
fτX [(α + ε− 1)τ ετ εX + ττX(1− α)(ε− 1) + αετ ]2
dτXH
Note that dτXH > 0 ⇒ dNH ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ τ ετ εX [(ε− 1)τX − ε] − ττX ≥ 0. Let us
define the following two continuous and monotonic functions f(τX) ≡ (ε− 1)τ ετ ε+1X
and g(τX) ≡ ετ ετ εX + ττX with f ′(τX) > 0, f ′′(τX) > 0, g′(τX) > 0 and g′′(τX) > 0.
Note that f(1)− g(1) < 0 implying that dNH < 0 when τX = 1. By continuity and
monotonicity of the two functions, only two cases are possible. They either never
cross, in which case dNH < 0∀τX ∈ [1,∞) and consequently NNash < NFB. Or,
they cross only once. That implies that ∃τ¯X > 1 such that f(τX) ≥ g(τX), ∀τX ≥ τ¯X
implying dNH > 0 ⇐⇒ τX ∈ (τ¯X ,∞). However note that:
lim
τX−>∞
NH = lim
τX−>∞
Lα (τ ετ εX + τ)
f ((α + ε− 1)τ ετ εX + ττX(α(−ε) + α + ε− 1) + αετ)
= NFB
implying that also in this case NNash < NFBX .
(2) If τCH = τCF = 1, the Nash policy maker solves the same problem as in (1) but income
is now given by IH(τXH , τXF ) = L + (τXH − 1)τPHH(τXH , τXF )CFH(τXH , τXF ). Taking
derivatives with respect to τXH and τXF and then imposing symmetry i.e., τXH = τXF =
τX , the first-order conditions at the symmetric Nash equilibrium can be written as:
ANashX (τX)
BNashX (τX)
= 0 (74)
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with
ANashX (τX) ≡ α{τ ε+4τ ε+1X [τX(τX(ε− α2ε) + 2α2ε+ (α− 1)α− ε2 + ε)− α2(ε+ 1) + α+ (ε− 1)ε]
+ τ2ε+3τ2εX [τX(τX((α− 1)ε2 − α+ ε+ 1) + α(−2ε2 + ε− 1) + (ε− 1)2) + α(ε− 1)ε]
+ τ3ε+2τ3εX [τX(α(ε− 1)τX(α+ ε− 1)− (2α+ 1)ε2 − 2(α− 2)αε+ (α− 1)α)
+ ε(α(α+ ε− 2) + ε− 1)]
+ τ4ε+1τ4εX (ε(α+ ε− 2)− (ε− 1)τX(α+ ε− 1)) + τ5τ2X(α+ ε− 1)}
BNashX (τX) ≡ (ε− 1)τX(τ ετ εX + ττX)(τ2ετ2εX − τ2)(−(α+ 1)ττX + τ ετ εX + ατ)
(τX(τ − ατ) + τ ετ εX + ατ)
(i) In order to show that there exists a solution with τX < 1, we first show that when
τX = 1, A
Nash
X (1) is negative. This is so given that A
Nash
X (1) = τ(τ
ε−τ)(τ ε +τ)2[(α−
1)τ ε + τ(−α− ε+ 1)] < 0.
(ii) Next, we show that for ε > 2 there exists a τX ∈ {0, 1} with ANashX (τX) > 0.
By continuity of ANashX (τX) this is enough to guarantee the existence of a solution.
Consider τX =
ε−2
ε
. Then,
ANashX (
ε−2
ε
) = τ
ε2
[(ε− 2)2τ 4(α+ ε− 1) + (ε− 2)4εε1−4ε(2 + 2ε2− 5ε+ 3αε− 2α)τ 4ε +
(ε−2)1+εε−ε(4+2α−6α2+3(ε−2)ε)τ 3+ε+( ε−2
ε
)2ε
(α(6ε−4)+(ε−2)(ε2−2))τ 2+2ε+
τ (α2(6ε− 4) + 2α(ε− 2)(2ε− 1) + ε3)
(
(ε−2)τ
ε
)3ε
] > 0 since each of the coefficients
is positive for ε > 2. This proves that a solution with τX < 1 exists.
(iii) Finally, we show that NNash < NFB.
(a) Let τNashX = f(α, ε, τ) and τ
FB
X = g(α, ε, τ) be, respectively, the Nash equi-
librium export subsidy and the export subsidy that implements the first-best
number of varieties . First we show that there is no intersection between the set
of τNashX and the set of τ
FB
X in the interval [0, 1]. If τX = τ
Nash
X , A
Nash
X (τ
Nash
X ) = 0.
At the same time τFBX is such N =
Lα(τ+(ττFBX )
ε)
fε(ατ+τ(1−α)τFBX +(ττFBX )ε)
= Lα
f(ε+α−1) = N
FB.
This last condition can be rewritten as (ττX)
ε = −εττX + τ(ε − 1). Note that
when combined, this two conditions are a system of two equations in τX . We
now investigate if there exists a τX such that both conditions are satisfied si-
multaneously. Once we substitute the above condition into ANashX we obtain a
fifth-order polynomial in τX which can be factorized into two polynomials. The
first polynomial is −ετ 5 (τX − 1) 2(α+ ε− 1), with solutions τX = {1, 1}. None
of these solutions solves (ττX)
ε = −εττX + τ(ε− 1). The second polynomial is
cubic and we call it AX
Nash
mod . It can be shown that there exist at most one real
solution of AX
Nash
mod . However, evaluating AX
Nash
mod at τX = 1 and τX = 0 we find
that both AX
Nash
mod (1) < 0 and AX
Nash
mod (0) < 0. Thus, by continuity of AX
Nash
mod ,
either there exists no real solution or there are at least two zeros of AX
Nash
mod = 0
that are real. Since there exists at most one real solution of AX
Nash
mod = 0 in [0, 1],
we can conclude that there is no intersection between the set of τNashX and the
set of τFBX in the interval [0, 1].
(b) The second step is to show that τFBX < τ
Nash
X in the interval [0, 1]. To this
end, recall that f and g are two continuous functions in the space {0 < α <
1, τ > 1, ε > 1}, given that the derivatives of τFBX and τNashX with respect to the
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three parameters always exists in the permitted parameter space. In point (a)
we proved that there is no intersection between g and f . As a consequence, we
either have τFBX < τ
Nash
X or the other way around. We evaluate both functions
at {α = 0.5, ε = 2, τ = 1.5} and find τFBX = 0.39 < 0.82 = τNashX . Thus, the non-
cooperative export subsidy is always smaller than the one needed to implement
the first-best number of varieties.
(c) Finally, from Lemma A3 (1) we know that 0 < τXH = τXF ≤ 1 ⇒ ∂NH∂τXH +
∂NF
∂τXH
< 0 which implies that dNH = dNF > 0 ⇐⇒ dτHX = dτXF < 0 i.e,
by symmetrically increasing the export subsidy in both countries policy makers
increase the number of varieties. It then follows that τFBX < τ
Nash
X ⇒ NNash <
NFB.
G Simultaneous Policy Choice
Proposition 8: Cooperative Policy Instruments. The cooperative policy maker sets the
first-best level of production subsidies and chooses the trade taxes such that τCoopI · τCoopX = 1.
The number of varieties equals the first-best level.
(1) τCoopC =
ε−1
ε
, τCoopI · τCoopX = 1 and NCoop = NFB.
Proof of Proposition 8. We have already proven in Propositions 2, 4 and 6 that the first-
best allocation can be implemented by eliminating the monopolistic distortion and by refraining
from using import or export taxes (i.e., by setting τCoopC =
ε−1
ε
and τCoopI = τ
Coop
X = 1). What
remains to show is that the first-best allocation can be implement even when τCoopC =
ε−1
ε
and
τCoopI τ
Coop
X = 1. To see why this is the case, notice that if τ
Coop
C =
ε−1
ε
and τCoopI τ
Coop
X = 1 NH =
NF = N
FB, i.e., this policy implements the first-best allocation. Intuitively, if τCoopC =
ε−1
ε
any
policy such that τCoopI τ
Coop
X = 1 allows to reach the social optimum since the effects of import
tariffs/subsidies are exactly offset by those of export subsidies/taxes.
Proposition 9: Nash-Equilibrium Policy Instruments. The Nash-equilibrium policy
consists of the first-best level of production subsidies, and inefficient import subsidies and export
taxes. Formally,
(1) τNashC = τ
Coop
C =
ε−1
ε
, τNashI < 1, τ
Nash
X > 1.
Proof of Proposition 9. In order to prove Proposition 9 we follow Dixit (1985) and we use
the primal approach to optimal policy instead of the indirect utility function i.e., we directly
maximize utility subject to the equilibrium conditions. The non-cooperative policy maker
maximizes domestic utility subject to the good market clearing conditions, the trade balance
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and the demand functions of the domestic and foreign economy. The Lagrangian associated
with the optimal policy problem of the non-cooperative policy maker can be formulated as:
L = P−αH (ττIHτXFPFFCHF + PHHCHH)
+ λ1
[
f(ε− 1)N
ε
ε−1
H − CHH − τCFH
]
+ λ2
[
f(ε− 1)N
ε
ε−1
F − CFF − τCHF
]
− λ3
[
(1− α)
α
(PHHCHH + ττIHτXFPFFCHF ) + ττXFPFFCHF − ττXHPHHCFH −QH
]
− λ4
[
(1− α)
α
(PFFCFF + ττIF τXHPHHCFH) + ττXHPHHCFH − ττXFPFFCHF −QF
]
− λ5 [P εHHCHH − (ττIHτXF )ε P εFFCHF ]− λ6 [P εFFCFF − (ττIF τXH)ε P εHHCFH ]
where PH , PHH and PFF are defined consistently with (6), (7) and (11). Making use of the
constraints and rearranging the first-order conditions of L with respect to CHH , CHF , CFF ,
CFH , NH , NF , τCH , τIH and τXH , which we evaluate at the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain,
respectively:
P 1−αHH
[
1 + (ττIτX)
1−ε]− α1−ε = λ1 + 1− α
α
λ3 + γ5
ττIτXP
1−α
HH
[
1 + (ττIτX)
1−ε]− α1−ε = λ2τ + λ3(ττX + 1− α
α
ττIτX
)
− γ4ττX − γ5 (ττIτX)ε
0 = λ2 +
1− α
α
γ4 + γ6
0 = λ1τ − λ3ττX + γ4
(
ττX +
1− α
α
ττIτX
)
− γ6 (ττIτX)ε
0 = λ1 − λ3 ε− 1
ετC
(1− α) (ττIτX)1−ε P 1−αHH
[
1 + (ττIτX)
1−ε]− α1−ε = λ2ε [1 + τ 1−ε (τIτX)−ε]+ λ3(1− α
α
+
1
τI
)
(ττIτX)
1−ε
+ γ4
{
1− α
α
− ε− 1
τC
[
1 + τ 1−ε (τIτX)
−ε]− τ−εI (ττX)1−ε}
− γ5ε+ γ6ε
(1− α)P 1−αHH
[
1 + (ττIτX)
1−ε]− α1−ε = λ3 [1− α
α
− τ−εI (ττX)1−ε
]
+ γ4
(
1− α
α
+
1
τI
)
(ττIτX)
1−ε
+ γ5ε− γ6ε
(1− α)P 1−αHH
[
1 + (ττIτX)
1−ε]− α1−ε = λ31− α
α
+ γ5ε (ττIτX)
ε−1
0 = λ3τ
−ε
I (ττX)
1−ε − γ4
[
1− α
α
(ττIτX)
1−ε + τ−εI (ττX)
1−ε
]
+ γ6ε (75)
where γ3 ≡ λ3PHH , γ4 ≡ λ4PHH , γ5 ≡ λ5P εHH and γ6 ≡ λ6P εHH .
Combining the previous equations, we can solve for τC and the multipliers:
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τC =
ε− 1
ε
λ1 = γ3 = P
1−α
HH α
[
1 + (ττIτX)
1−ε]− α1−ε
γ4 =
P 1−αHH α
2(1− α)(ε(τX − 1)− τX) [1 + (ττIτX)1−ε]−
α
1−ε
(ε− 1)(α + (1− α)τI)τX
γ5 = 0
γ6 = −P
1−α
HH ατ
1−ε(τIτX)−ε [1 + (ττIτX)1−ε]
− α
1−ε
ε− 1
λ2 = −γ6 − γ4
α
(76)
The first condition in (76) already states that the Nash equilibrium production subsidy com-
pletely offsets the monopolistic distortion. What remains to show is that τNashI < 1 and
τNashX > 1. Substituting the expressions for the multipliers and the solution for τC in the first-
order conditions and simplifying, we are left with two equations, the derivative with respect to
CHF and the one with respect to NF . The derivative with respect to CHF is given by:
A1(τI , τX) + A2(τI , τX) + A3(τI , τX) = 0 (77)
where:
A1(τI , τX) ≡ −(ε− 1)(1− τI)τ 2X(α + (1− α)τI)
A2(τI , τX) ≡ −(ε− (ε− 1)τX)(ατX + 1− α)
A3(τI , τX) ≡ −(α + (1− α)τI)(ττX)1−ετ−εI
Note that:
(i) A3(τI , τX) < 0 always;
(ii) A1(τI , τX) < 0 ⇐⇒ τI < 1;
(iii) A2(τI , τX) < 0 ⇐⇒ τX < εε−1 .
Thus, a necessary condition for τI and τX to solve equation (77) is that if τX <
ε
ε−1 then
τI > 1. By combining (77) with the first-order condition with respect to NF we obtain a second
condition:
B1(τI , τX) +B2(τI , τX) +B3(τI , τX) = 0 (78)
where
B1(τI , τX) ≡ −τ 2X(ε− 1)(α + (1− α)τI)(1− ε(1− τI))
B2(τI , τX) ≡ (−ε+ τX(ε− 1))(ε− (1− α))τ ε−1(τIτX)ε
B2(τI , τX) ≡ −α(−ε+ τX(ε− 1))2
Note that:
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(i) B3(τI , τX) < 0 always;
(ii) B1(τI , τX) < 0 ⇐⇒ τI > ε−1ε ;
(iii) B2(τI , τX) < 0 ⇐⇒ τX < εε−1 .
Thus, a necessary condition for τI and τX to solve equation (78) is that if τX <
ε
ε−1 then
τI <
ε−1
ε
. Note that this condition contradicts the one needed for (77). Therefore, the only
possible solution is τNashX >
ε
ε−1 i.e., this proves that τ
Nash
X > 1.
We now have to show that τNashI < 1. We will prove this by contradiction. First, we show
that a necessary condition for τNashI > 1 is that τ
Nash
I · τNashX < 1. Second, we show that if
τNashI > 1 it must be that τ
Nash
X < 1, which contradicts the fact that τ
Nash
X > 1. In order to
show the first point, it is useful to rewrite equation (77) as follows:
−(ε−1)(1−τI)τX(ατX +(1−α)τIX)+((ε−1)τX−ε)(ατX +1−α)− (ατX +(1−α)τIX)(τ1−ετ−εIX) = 0
where τIX ≡ τIτX . If we solve the previous equation for τI we obtain:
τNashI =
C1(τX , τIX)
C2(τX , τIX)
(79)
where:
C1(τX , τIX) ≡ (τIXτ)−ε(τIXτ(1− α) + (τIXτ)εε(1− α− τX + 2ατX)
+ ατXτ + (τIXτ)
ετX(1− α) + τ 1+εIX τ ετX(ε− 1)(1− α))
C2(τX , τIX) ≡ (ε− 1)τX(τIX(1− α) + ατX)
Now suppose that τI > 0 and C2(τX , τIX) > 0, it has to be the case that C1(τX , τIX) > 0 too.
Moreover, for τNashI to be greater than 1, C1(τX , τIX)− C2(τX , τIX) should be greater than 0:
C3(τI , τX) ≡ C1(τX , τIX)− C2(τX , τIX) =
(τIXτ)
−ε(τIXτ(1− α) + αττX + (τIXτ)ε((1− α)ε+ (1− α+ 2τIX(1− α)(ε− 1)− ε+ 2αε)τX + α(ε− 1)τ2X)
Note that:
(i) C3(τI , τX) is linear in α;
(ii) α = 0 and τIX > 1 implies C3 = −(τIXτ)−ε(τIXτ+(τIXτ)ε(ε+(ε−1)(τIX−1)+τIXτX(ε−
1))) < 0;
(iii) α = 1 and τIX > 1 implies C3 = −(τIXτ)−ε(ττX + (ττIX)ε(ετX + (ε− 1)τ 2X)) < 0;
(iv) By continuity, ∀α ∈ (0, 1) τIX > 1⇒ C3 < 0⇒ τNashI < 1;
(v) Thus, a necessary condition for τNashI > 1 is τIX < 1 .
However, we have already proven that τNashX > 1 thus, it cannot be that τ
Nash
I > 1 and
τNashIX ≡ τNashI τNashX < 1. Therefore, it has to be that τNashI < 1.
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